Can The Governance Of Non-State-Owned Shareholders Curb The Risk Of Stock Price Collapse?

In recent years,China’s capital market has frequently seen stock price collapse,which has had a bad impact on the operation of the capital market and the development of enterprises.Stock price collapse is a phenomenon that the stock price of enterprises is overvalued by the market due to agency problems and information asymmetry.When negative news is suddenly revealed,the stock price plummets.Based on this,scholars have studied how to curb the stock price collapse by alleviating the agency problem and information asymmetry from all aspects.The absence of the owner of state-owned enterprises and the inherent attribute of insider control lead to the principal-agent problem of state-owned enterprises more serious than that of private enterprises.In order to improve the governance of state-owned enterprises and improve the operation efficiency of enterprises,the state has issued a number of policies for this purpose.Especially since the 18 th National Congress,the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises has entered the deep water area.Although whether the reform of state-owned enterprises can achieve the original intention of the policy,there are constant disputes in academia and practice.However,scholars have found that the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises has alleviated the phenomenon of "dominance of one share" of state-owned shareholders,reduced the absence of owners and insider control of state-owned enterprises,and improved the quality of enterprise information disclosure.So in the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,can the improvement of governance effect brought by heterogeneous shareholders reduce the possibility of sharp decline of stock prices in the future? At present,there is no literature to study this.Based on the sample of A-share state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2019,this thesis studies the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the risk of stock price collapse in the mixed reform of stateowned enterprises from the two dimensions of ownership structure and high-level governance.The study found that through the simple introduction of non-state-owned capital for mixed reform,it can not play the regulatory role of heterogeneous shareholders,and the inhibitory effect on the risk of stock price collapse is not obvious.Only when the non-state-owned shareholders have the ability to appoint representatives to the board of directors,the business decision-making body of the enterprise,can the expected purpose of the policy be truly achieved.In other words,only by giving full play to the vitality of non-state-owned capital,strengthening the supervision of state-owned enterprise executives and improving the quality of information disclosure,can we really reduce the possibility of sharp decline in enterprise share price.In addition,this thesis finds that with the increase of the proportion of directors and supervisors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders,the inhibition effect on the risk of stock price collapse is stronger.After the cross-sectional analysis,it is found that the inhibitory effect of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the risk of stock price collapse is more significant in enterprises with poor internal control quality and low degree of marketization.The mechanism test shows that non-state-owned shareholders can restrain the sharp decline of stock price by improving the transparency of enterprise information and alleviating the agency problems such as unnecessary on-the-job consumption of senior executives.The research conclusion of this thesis is still valid in the robustness test of Heckman twostage regression,PSM + Multi-stage DID,increasing fixed effect,instrumental variables and grouping regression.Through the research of this thesis,it provides some empirical evidence for the policy promotion and revision of the mixed ownership reform of stateowned enterprises and the maintenance of the stability of the capital market.