The Appointment Of Directors,Supervisors And Managers By Non-state Shareholders And The R & D Investment Of State-owned Enterprises

In recent years,with the constant change of the external circumstances,the impact of COVID-19,the international situation is becoming more and more complex,the competition in production and trade is becoming increasingly fierce,and the economic growth is slowing down in an all-round way.Innovation is also becoming more and more important for national development,and the demand for building an innovative country and realizing the self-reliance of core technology is becoming more and more urgent.As the backbone of Chinese Socialistic Economy and an crucial subject of scientific and technological innovation,state-owned companies ought to improve the capacity of independent innovation,take the lead and speed up the pace of implementing the strategy of innovation driven development.In fact,due to the absence of owners,long agency chain and rigid mechanism,the innovation power of state-owned enterprises is slightly insufficient and the innovation efficiency is not satisfactory.Therefore,they should catch hold of the development opportunity of mixed ownership reform,push through further reform,suit the remedy to the case and stimulate their own innovation vitality.The goal of mixed ownership reform is not to "mix",but to "reform".At the moment,the mixed ownership reform in China has developed from the initial stage of diversification of investors to the important stage of non-state-owned shareholders participating in corporate governance.Previous studies have shown that the mixed ownership structure has limited influence on the advancement of corporate governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises.Only when non-state-owned shareholders send directors,supervisors or senior managers to the top of the enterprise,participate in the daily business decision-making of the enterprise,and truly obtain the right to speak,can their supervision function and governance effect be brought into full play.Therefore,on the premise of defending the rights and interests of state-owned capital,the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises should introduce non-state-owned shareholders,simplify administration and delegate power,give more discourse power to non-state-owned shareholders,build professional and high-quality enterprise operation and management groups,and raise the business efficiency and innovation performance of state-owned enterprises.This paper selects the data of companies in which non-state-owned shareholders sent directors,supervisors and managers in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share state-owned listed companies from 2012 to 2019.Based on the principal-agent theory,priority financing theory and technological innovation theory,this paper starts from the two dimensions of the proportion of non-state-owned shareholders in the total number of directors,supervisors and managers of state-owned enterprises and the sum of their shareholding proportion.This paper empirically tests the impact of non-state-owned shareholders’ appointment of directors,supervisors and managers on the innovation investment of state-owned enterprises under the background of mixed ownership reform,and draws the following conclusions: Firstly,the appointment of directors,supervisors and managers by non-state-owned shareholders can promote the R & D investment of state-owned enterprises,but their shareholding ratio has no significant impact on R & D investment.Secondly,the appointment of directors,supervisors and managers by non-state-owned shareholders enables state-owned enterprises to improve the R & D investment by decreasing equity agency costs.Further research shows that industry competitiveness can regulate the relationship between the appointment of directors,supervisors and managers by non-state-owned shareholders and the state-owned companies’ R & D investment.Specifically,in competitive industries,the appointment of directors,supervisors and managers by non-state-owned shareholders promotes the R& D investment of enterprises,and in monopoly industries,the appointment of directors,supervisors and managers by non-state-owned shareholders inhibits the R & D investment of enterprises;Considering the heterogeneity of R & D,the appointment of directors,supervisors and managers by non-state-owned shareholders can promote the exploratory innovation investment of state-owned enterprises,and has no significant impact on the developmental innovation investment.