Research On The Influence Of Non-State-Owned Shareholders’ Participation On The State-Owned Enterprise Governance Efficiency

The state-owned enterprise plays a key role in promoting the national governance system and governance capacity modernization.However,due to the lack of separation between the government and enterprise,low efficiency,corruption and other problems,their substantive role in economic development has been seriously restricted,and state-owned enterprises have been controversial.Therefore,the reform of mixed ownership has rapidly become an important part of the state-owned enterprise reform.In 2013,the report of the 18th CPC Central Committee clearly stated that state-owned enterprises will promote the mixed ownership reform in the future,which marks that the state-owned enterprise reform has officially entered a new starting point of national integration of equity and has entered a new stage of comprehensive deepening reform.At the Central Government Economic Work Conference,it was proposed that the reform of mixed ownership should continue to be the top design of deepening the state-owned enterprise reform in December 2016.In 2017,the report of the 19th National Congress once again put forword the direction of China’s state-owned enterprise reform,and will continue to promote the mixed ownership reform and build world-class enterprises as the focus of future state-owned enterprise reform.Therefore,the reform of mixed ownership attracts the participation of non-state shareholders and plays its substantive governance role,which is of great to significantly improve the governance efficiency of state-owned enterprises and promote the state-owned enterprise high-quality development,and has unique theoretical and practical significance.This paper is divided into six parts.First,it sorts out the relevant literature at home and abroad on the reform of mixed ownership,the participation of non-state shareholders,and the efficiency of corporate governance,and evaluates the relevant research results,and the efficiency of corporate governance.Second,on the basis of theoretical analysis,put forward research hypothesis of non-state shareholders’ participation in promoting the state-owned enterprise governance efficiency,and further analyze the impact mechanism of non-state shareholders’ participation on corporate governance efficiency,and verify research hypothesis by constructing an empirical model.Final,further expand and analyze the impact of non-state shareholders’ participation on corporate value and total factor productivity by improving the efficiency of state-owned enterprise governance,and put forward targeted policy recommendations based on the empirical analysis results.The main conclusion of this paper is as follows: First,the participation of non-state shareholder can significantly improve the state-owned enterprise governance efficiency.Second,the participation of non-state shareholders in the improvement of the governance efficiency of state-owned enterprises shows obvious heterogeneity.Compared with central enterprises,group companies and special functional state-owned enterprises,the participation of non-state shareholders has a more significant role in promoting the corporate governance efficiency of local state-owned enterprises,subsidiaries and general commercial state-owned enterprises.Third,the second type of agency cost plays a part of intermediary role in the influence of non-state shareholders’ participation on the efficiency of state-owned enterprise governance.Fourth,the equity participation of non-state shareholder can significantly improve the corporate value and total factor productivity by improving the governance efficiency of state-owned enterprises;However,the results of non-state shareholders’ appointment of directors,supervisors and senior executives are not significant.The reason may be that compared with equity participation,non-state-owned shareholders participate in the governance of state-owned enterprises through the appointment of senior managers with a lower degree,resulting in their lack of voice in state-owned enterprises and unable to play a substantive governance role.The innovation of this paper is as follow: First,considering the positive impact and heterogeneity of non-state shareholder participation on the efficiency of state-owned governance from the perspective of governance efficiency,it introduces a new perspective of non-state shareholder participation to study the state-owned enterprise governance efficiency,and enriches the relevant research on non-state shareholder governance and the efficiency of state-owned enterprise governance.The second is to clarify the positive impact of the non-state-owned shareholder on the state-owned enterprise governance efficiency in the mixed reform context,further test the impact of the state-owned enterprise governance efficiency in the mixed reform on enterprise value and total factor productivity,and deepen the understanding of state-owned enterprises on the improvement of governance efficiency brought by the introduction of non-state-owned shareholder governance.