Research On The Influence Of Non-state-owned Shareholder Governance On The De-zombification Of State-owned Enterprises

China is in the critical period of economic transformation,and the continuous promotion of supply-side structural reform is an important means to achieve economic transformation.Overcapacity reduction is the most important task in the reform,and the key to achieve this task is to properly deal with zombie enterprises.Zombie companies are those that are not profitable and survive on various subsidies.China’s state-owned enterprises are facing a serious zombified problem,and state-owned enterprises as the mainstay of the development of national cause,to solve the zombified problem is crucial to promote the high-quality development of national economy.At the same time,since the third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee,the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises has become one of the key issues in the reform of state-owned enterprises,and the governance role of non-state-owned shareholders in state-owned enterprises has gradually received academic attention.Based on the above background,this paper studies the influence of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the de-zombification of state-owned enterprises.In this paper,the annual data of 9,098 competitive soes from 2008 to 2020 are used as research samples,and Logit regression is used to test the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the de-zombification of soes.Then,the heterogeneity of non-state-owned shareholder governance on state-owned enterprises’ de-zombification is discussed from two aspects of state-owned enterprises’ hierarchy and management power.The robustness test was carried out by controlling endogeneity and changing proxy variables.Further,this paper uses the mediation effect test method to analyze the specific path that non-state-owned shareholder governance has an impact on the zombification of State-Owned enterprises,and studies whether non-state-owned shareholder governance can reduce the zombification degree of state-owned enterprises by reducing the level of financialization and reducing inefficient investment.Through theoretical analysis and empirical research,this paper draws the following conclusions: The participation of non-state-owned shareholders in corporate governance can reduce the probability of state-owned enterprises becoming zombie enterprises,and promote the de-zombie of state-owned enterprises;The participation of non-state-owned shareholders in corporate governance can have an impact on corporate de-zombification by reducing the degree of financialization of state-owned enterprises and reducing inefficient investment.This paper not only enriched the relevant literature on the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and the zombification of State-Owned enterprises,but also more directly provided empirical evidence for the reform of mixed ownership,which has certain reference value for further improving the reform of mixed ownership and the governance of state-owned zombie enterprises in China.