| The private enterprises made a significant contribution to stimulating the development of national socialist market economy and economic growth.Since the reform and opening up for more than 40 years,the private enterprises have made significant contribution to the rapid development of national economy.Relevant data show that the private enterprises contribute more than 50% of the national tax revenue,60% of our country’s GDP(among which High-tech Enterprises account for more than 70%),80% of urban job vacancies,and over 90% of new job opportunities(Liu Xianwei and Wen Fengan,2018).Private enterprises have been playing an important role in reform and innovation,sustainable economic development and social stability.At present.Our national economic development has transformed from rapid-growth stage to high-quality stage,accompanied by private enterprises’ transformation from traditional industries to capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries,and have expanded in strategic emerging industries and other fields.However,based on the new stage of development,the private enterprises still face problems such as weak market demand,difficult and expensive financing,and lack of motivation for transformation and upgrading.The private enterprises need to be further improved to achieve high-quality development in the new development pattern(Liu Xianwei and Wen Fengan,2018).Therefore,the research problem of how private enterprises can improve the efficiency of operation and management has attracted the attention of scholars.In practice,with the continuous adjustment of domestic and foreign economic structures,in order to promote the improvement of enterprise management efficiency and promote the sound and rapid development of the national economy,the state vigorously implements mixed ownership reform,and encourages the mix of state-owned shares and non-state-owned shares to promote the improvement of the governance structure,thereby improving the efficiency of enterprise operation and management.Regarding the topic of mixed ownership reform,existing academic research mainly focuses on discussing the potential governance effects of non-state-owned capital entering state-owned enterprises during mixed ownership reform(Hu Shiyang and Lu Zhengfei,2015;Liu Yunguo et al.,2015;Zeng Shiyun et al.,2017;Cai Guilong et al.,2018;Lu Dong et al.,2019;Zhang Renzhi,2019;Xiang Dong and Yu Yumiao,2020;Cheng et al.,2020;Cao Feng and Gu Xiaoying,2021;He Ying et al.,2022).The relevant analysis of the "reverse" mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises still needs to be deepened(Zhang Shuo and Song Zengji,2016;Li Wengui and Shao Yiping,2016;Yu Jingwen,2018;Sun Liang and Liu Chun,2021;Dong Yan and Liu Peizhong,2021;Li Zengfu et al.,2021).When defining the reverse mixed ownership reform,the existing literatures generally neglect to describe the difference in the actual influence of state-owned non-actual control entities in the non-state-owned economy from the perspective of “discourse power”.Therefore,it mainly focuses on whether to hold equity,rather than whether we have the "right to speak" to observe the "reverse" mixed ownership reform(Yu Jingwen,2018;Dong Yan and Liu Peizhong,2021;Li Zengfu et al.,2021).This thesis shows that one of the key problems is the definition and analysis of the "reverse" mixed ownership reform in the existing literature has not touched the substantive "reform"(renovation of the governance structure),but only stays at the equity level "mixed"(formally shareholding).Compared with pure state-owned shareholding(shareholding),in the process of "reverse" mixed ownership reform,it may be more important if state-owned capital can actually participate in the operation and management of non-state-owned enterprises.Equity means that you can only obtain the "dividend rights" of the shares held by it,and having daily management rights means that you have substantively participated in the business activities of the investee,and actually use the mechanism of "voice" and "support".Supervision need to be strengthened and support needs to be enhanced,so as to achieve the goal of improving the governance mechanism of the invested non-stateowned enterprises and achieve connotative development.In the existing literature on "positive" mixed ownership reform,giving non-state-owned shareholders the right to speak has positive significance(Huang Sujian,2014;Hao Yunhong and Wang Qian,2015;Cai Guilong et al.,2018;Lu Dong et al.,2019;Cheng et al.,2020).Then,in the process of "reverse" mixed ownership reform,to further promote the steady growth of the non-state-owned economy by supplementing and improving the governance structure,can the positive effect of state-owned shares be better played? Based on the above analysis,it can be seen that in this process,giving private enterprises a certain “discourse power” is the key to promote the transformation of reverse mixed ownership reform from formality to substance.In particular,the "reverse" mixed ownership reform does not mean that stateowned capital enters all industries in an all-round and indiscriminate manner,but means that state-owned capital should give full play to its platform role and focus on entering high-tech,ecological environmental protection and other strategically important industries,so as to promote resource integration,strategic cooperation and win-win solution in non-state-owned enterprises through equity investment,and thereby enhancing their innovation and competitiveness.To this end,based on a research sample of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries,this paper examines the impact of state-owned shares’ voice on strategic The impact of private enterprises investment decision-making activities in emerging industries and their possible mechanisms.The answer of this question in this study not only helps to deepen the understanding of "reverse" mixed-ownership reform in existing research,but also provides a new perspective on how to further promote the development of the private enterprise through mixed-ownership reform experience.This paper mainly examines the influence of the voice of state-owned shares of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries on investment decisionmaking behavior.As we know,the investment decision-making behavior of company is related to the implementation of the company strategy,future development and the enhancement of the company’s value.According to the research on strategic emerging industries and their different investment objectives,this paper divides investment decision-making behaviors into innovative investment and tangible asset investment.Among them,innovation investment involves two aspects: internal direct innovation and external purchase of innovation,namely internal R&D investment and external mergers and acquisitions;tangible asset investment refers to the comprehensive investment efficiency other than enterprise R&D investment.Therefore,the empirical research part of this paper mainly examines the influence of private enterprises state-owned shares voice on enterprise innovation,M&A performance and investment efficiency.Specifically,this paper mainly answers the following three questions:(1)What impact does the state-owned share voice of private enterprises have on corporate investment decision-making(corporate innovation,M&A performance,and corporate investment efficiency)?(2)How does the heterogeneity of enterprises affect the relationship between the voice of private enterprises state-owned shares and the investment decision-making behavior of enterprises?(3)What is the path through which the voice of state-owned shares of private enterprises affects the investment decision-making behavior of enterprises?Based on the above research content,the main research conclusions of this paper are as follows:Firstly,from the perspective of the influence of state-owned shares of private enterprises on enterprise innovation,this paper is based on the background of the reverse mixed ownership reform in which state-owned capital enters private enterprises in strategic emerging industries,through manual collection and sorting of state-owned capital to appoint senior management personnel to enter the reverse mixed ownership reform.Based on the data of directors and senior supervisors of enterprises,the variables that describe the difference in the voice of China shareholding in the reverse mixed ownership reform are constructed,and its impact on the R&D innovation of private enterprises and its potential mechanism are investigated.The research finds: Firstly,compared with the state-owned shares that do not have the right to speak,giving the state-owned shares the right to speak in the reverse mixed ownership reform can not only effectively improve the R&D innovation investment level of target private enterprises,but also promote the improvement of their substantive innovation capabilities.Secondly,further analysis finds that when state-owned shares have a higher administrative level,better match with the privately-owned areas being mixed,or when the personnel are appointed as senior managers,the state-owned shares of private enterprises play a stronger role in promoting R&D innovation.Finally,the path analysis results show that the acquisition of the voice of state-owned shares can reduce the tax burden and increase government subsidies,thereby promoting the improvement of enterprises innovation ability,which verifies the resource support effect of the voice of stateowned shares.Secondly,in terms of the influence of the voice of state-owned shares of private enterprises on M&A performance,based on the background of the reverse mixed ownership reform of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries,this paper constructs the variables of the differences in the voice of shares in China in the reverse mixed ownership reform.This paper examines its impact on the M&A performance of private enterprises and its potential mechanism.The research finds:Firstly,compared with the state-owned shares that do not have the right to speak,giving the state-owned shares the right to speak in the reverse mixed ownership reform helps to promote the improvement of the M&A performance of the mixedreformed enterprises.Secondly,further analysis finds that when the private enterprises under mixed ownership reform have low quality of internal control,low marketization in the region or in non-eastern regions,and low competition in the industry,the state-owned share voice of private enterprises promotes the improvement of M&A performance effect is stronger.Finally,the results of the mechanism test show that the voice of state-owned shares can help improve the technical efficiency and market demand management capabilities of private enterprises undergoing mixed-ownership reform,so as to give full play to the synergistic integration effect brought about by mergers and acquisitions.Thirdly,in terms of the influence of the state-owned share voice of private enterprises on the investment efficiency of enterprises,based on the background of the reverse mixed ownership reform of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries,this paper constructs the variables of the difference in the voice of China’s shareholding rights in the reverse mixed ownership reform.And investigate its impact on the investment efficiency of private enterprises and its potential mechanism.The study found that compared with the state-owned shares that do not have the right to speak,giving the state-owned shares the right to speak in the reverse mixed ownership reform helps to improve the investment efficiency of private enterprises under mixed ownership reform,and is mainly manifested in helping to alleviate the problems of private enterprises undergoing mixed ownership reform underinvestment.Second,further analysis finds that when the executive incentive mechanism or the historical foundation of common governance is better,the effect of state-owned share voice in promoting the improvement of enterprise investment efficiency is more obvious;The difference is that the state-owned capital has the most obvious effect when it assigns executives to the private enterprises that have been reformed.The nonlinear test results also show that in terms of mitigating underinvestment,the better it is not that the more staff the state-owned capital delegates.Finally,the results of the mechanism test show that the voice of stateowned shares can help alleviate financing constraints and obtain government subsidies,thereby promoting the improvement of investment efficiency of private enterprises under mixed ownership reform.Compared with the existing literature,the possible research contributions of this paper are as follows:First of all,it broadens the relevant research on the governance effect of stateowned shares "discourse power" in the reverse mixed ownership reform.Based on the perspective of the state-owned shares of private enterprises in the process of reverse mixed ownership reform,this paper analyzes its impact on the investment decision-making behavior of enterprises,and focuses on the previous research that simply examines whether state-owned capital holds share or not.State-owned capital,as the non-actual control subject in private enterprises in strategic emerging industries,can gain the "discourse power" by appointing its interest spokesperson,which can influence the corporate governance and strategic decision-making of enterprises to a certain extent.However,the existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of state-owned capital’s shareholding ratio on enterprise investment decisions,and there is almost no in-depth study on the impact of whether non-actual control entities appoint their interest spokespersons to enter the enterprise’s highlevel governance structure.Therefore,this paper examines the potential effect of China’s shareholding power in the process of reverse mixed ownership reform of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries.In-depth understanding of how to promote reverse mixed ownership reform provides experience.Secondly,it enriches the relevant research on the influencing factors of corporate investment decisions.At present,a large number of literatures have studied the influencing factors of enterprise investment decision-making behavior from the external environment and internal governance characteristics of enterprises,but there is no literature to examine the influence of the voice of non-actual control entities in enterprises on enterprise investment decision-making behavior.By studying the influence of state-owned shares voice in strategic emerging industries on corporate investment decision-making behavior,this paper provides empirical evidence for the emergence of differences in state-owned shares voice,and deepens the understanding of the heterogeneous investment behavior of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries.Finally,it has important reference value for how private enterprises in strategic emerging industries use state-owned capital to promote the high-quality development of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries.Strategic emerging industries play an important and leading role in the overall economic and social situation and long-term development.How state-owned capital exerts its voice is crucial to the development of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries.However,state-owned capital’s investment in private enterprises in strategic emerging industries is more about holding shares,rather than giving full play to the functions of "resource support" and "consultation and supervision".This paper proves that,compared with state-owned shares that do not have the right to speak,giving state-owned shares the right to speak has a positive and significant impact on the investment decision-making behavior of private enterprises in strategic emerging industries,thus providing suggestions for how strategic private enterprises can improve their high-level team governance through mixed ownership reform for inspiration. |
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