Research On Information Sharing Incentive Of Platform E-commerce Supply Chain

E-commerce has developed rapidly in recent years,with more and more manufacturers selling products to consumers through e-commerce platforms,which have also attracted a large number of third-party merchants.However,since customers usually interact directly with the website or mobile application of the platform,the platform has more information about the market demand than the merchants,that is,there is information asymmetry in the supply chain.At present,the researches on the coordination operation of supply chain considering information sharing mostly focus on the information sharing between manufacturers and retailers in the traditional supply chain,and few choose the e-commerce supply chain with research platform as the information owner.In order to alleviate the negative effects brought by horizontal competition and optimize the utilization of supply chain resources,this thesis establishes an information sharing decision-making model between platform ecommerce and third-party merchants,and studies the participants’ choice of strategy and incentive contract effectiveness.Firstly,considering the supply chain consisting of an e-commerce platform,a platform merchant and a manufacturer,game models are established based on the two strategies of information sharing and information not sharing respectively and comparative analysis is made.The research finds that: when the platform chooses to share demand information,the wholesale price of manufacturers,the retail price and sales volume of merchants on the platform will be increased to some extent.Merchants have the motivation to obtain platform information,and the platform selection and information sharing with merchants can significantly improve the overall performance and benefits of the supply chain,that is,information sharing is valuable.The demand information input level of platform e-commerce is positively correlated with the market size,but the platform lacks the motivation to actively share its private information free of charge.Secondly,in order to compensate for the loss of information shared by the platform,the game model is constructed respectively considering the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract,and the influence of different factors on the expected profit of each member and the whole supply chain is explored.The results show that both the cost-sharing contract and the revenue-sharing contract considered in this thesis are conducive to the realization of the information sharing within the platform and the Pareto optimization of each member,so as to reduce the imbalance of the platform ecology caused by the competition conflict at the retail end.However,as the incentive contract is always beneficial to the platform,the restrictive conditions for merchants to participate in the game should be considered when setting the proportion range of the contract.Compared with revenue-sharing contract,cost-sharing contract has a more significant improvement effect on the overall performance of the supply chain.Thirdly,J platform is selected as an example analysis object,and combined with the actual situation of its platform supply chain operation and internal information sharing,the change trend of total profit under three different strategies of information sharing under cost-sharing contract,information sharing under revenue sharing and information not sharing is observed.It is found that the introduction of two kinds of contracts can generate positive incentives for the platform e-commerce supply chain.In this thesis,the Stackelberg game method is used to study the information sharing decision and incentive of the members of the platform e-commerce supply chain,considering the platform information acquisition cost and consumer channel preference and other factors,which can provide reference for related enterprises to make the optimal cooperation way and measure the information sharing effectiveness.