| In recent years,China has constantly shed light on the market-oriented reform process of state-owned enterprises,and definitely ordered that the reform of state-owned enterprises is an active way to achieve the transformation of state-owned enterprises’ market-oriented governance.Through equity integration and cross shareholding,we can pay attention to the advantages of non-state-owned capital in market perception and lead the development of state-owned enterprises.The existing research first to aim light onto the reform of mixed ownership and introduces non-state-owned shareholders to realize the variety of stock right and the checks and balances of equity,that is,to realize the "mixed ownership" at the equity level.The variety of stock right and checks and balances of equity have taken an active role in the company’s decision-making and operation.In terms of company decision-making,mixed reform can affect the company’s R&D investment,promote the innovation of state-owned companies,improve investment efficiency and reduce company violations.In terms of company operation,the mixed reform can alleviate the financing constraints of state-owned enterprises,accelerate the resource allocation of state-owned companies and reduce the zombie level of state-owned companies.Secondly,in the context of the mixed reform,scholars began to pay attention to the characteristics of non-state-owned equity introduced after the mixed reform,and study the impact of non-state-owned equity holdings among the top ten shareholders on corporate governance,that is,to achieve "integration" at the equity level.To some extent,the entry of non-state-owned shareholders into enterprises can alert operating efficiency and financial performance.However,only realizing the "mixing" and"combination" of equity exerts a limited effect on governance.Non-state-owned external shareholders generally hold low shares and cannot compete with controlling shareholders.Hence,the research sheds light on the governance of non-state-owned shareholders.In addition to this,observe how it exerts a critical effect on corporate governance from the two dimensions of equity and board of directors.The quality of the financial and textual information published by the company is a vital component of corporate governance.This information is crucial to an open,information-driven capital market,which is the foundation for value judgement makers to make critical investment decisions and a vital cornerstone for the orderly development of capital markets.Therefore,enhancing the quality of financial and textual information has become one of the most meaningful research topics in corporate governance.In summary,this article pays attention to the implications of equity governance and board governance of non-state-owned enterprises on the quality of financial and textual information in the process of mixed reform.Besides,we considered how non-state-owned shareholders exerts a crucial effect on the quality of financial and textual information which corporate disclosures in the case of government decentralization and external governance.To sum up the above,this study selected data from A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2019 to empirically demonstrate the impact of both non-state shareholder equity governance and board governance on the financial and textual information disclosed by state-owned enterprises.It is found that non-state-owned shareholder equity governance and board governance can critically alleviate the quality of information disclosure,and the mechanism is to reduce agency costs,upgrading the quality of information disclosure by integrating resources.Moreover,this promotion effect is more significant in state-owned enterprises with low pyramid level,low equity concentration,low attention of analysts and high degree of marketization.But overall,the result of non-state-owned shareholders’ equity governance is not as good as that of non-state-owned shareholders’ board of directors.In addition,a variety of non-state-owned shareholders have diversity results.The more diversity of non-state-owned shareholders’ holdings,the better the financial and textual information disclosed of by state-owned enterprises;In addition,the non-state-owned shareholders held by institutional investors have the most excellent promote in the quality of information disclosure.This paper enriches the existing research from the following points.First,the innovation of research perspective improves the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on information disclosure.This paper sheds light on the governance of non-state-owned shareholders under the mixed reform,that is,from the two levels of equity and board of directors,when the non-state-owned shareholders reach the governance level,the impact on the quality of information disclosure.In addition,this paper further considers which nature of non-state-owned shareholders has the critical effect on the standards of information disclosure.Secondly,the research is innovative in that it evolves the research on the factors affecting information disclosure.This paper examines the implications for the quality of financial and textual information from the perspective of the introduction of external shareholders’ equity and directors.Third,the innovation of influence mechanism.From the perspective of government decentralization and external monitoring mechanism,this paper enhances the impact of non-state-owned shareholder governance on the quality of information disclosure,and proves that reducing government intervention and improving the market environment are effective internal and external factors for non-state-owned shareholders to give rise to governance.There are the following deficiencies in this paper.First,there are deficiencies in the measurement method of information disclosure index.In the future,we can consider building new indicators to measure the quality of information disclosure from the level of accounting information and text.Second,this paper does not discuss the shareholder heterogeneity of appointed directors.In future research,we can pay attention to the heterogeneity of non-state-owned shareholders of appointed directors. |
