Introducing Non-state-owned Shareholder To State-owned Enterprise Executives Impact Of Salary Performance Sensitivity

With the rapid development of China's economy,the role of state-owned enterprises in the sustained growth of the national economy has become increasingly prominent.It is in an important position in China's economic lifeline.For the state-owned enterprises in China to release vitality,the reform of state-owned enterprises cannot be delayed.The reform of ownership will be an important direction in the reform of state-owned enterprises.The "Decision" promulgated by the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed to actively develop a mixed-ownership economy,and in the report of the 19th National Congress,the two"unwavering" embodies the attitude of our party to actively develop a mixed-ownership economy.And determination.However,the research on the reform of state-owned mixed ownership system mostly stays in the theoretical discussion of mixed reform.There is still a lack of empirical evidence for the study of whether mixed ownership reform can improve the management and governance efficiency of state-owned enterprises.Based on this,the core research question of this paper is whether the introduction of non-state-owned shareholder ownership will improve the quality of governance of state-owned enterprises.This paper uses the data of state-owned listed companies from 2014 to 2017 as a sample.By manually extracting the data of the top ten shareholders and the shareholding ratio disclosed by the listed company's annual report,the degree of non-state-owned shareholders' participation in state-owned enterprises is measured from the equity structure dimension.On the basis of this,the study will introduce the impact of the non-state-owned shareholder ownership on the sensitivity of state-owned enterprise executive compensation performance.Using the propensity score matching method and the group regression model to test the sensitivity of non-state-owned equity changes from 2014 to 2017 on executive compensation performance,and explore the impact of the introduction of non-state-owned equity on corporate governance.The research significance of this paper is as follows:First,most of the domestic research on mixed ownership reform focuses on the research on the impact of mixed reform on corporate performance and corporate innovation,and less on the impact of mixed reform on executive compensation incentives.This paper starts with the dimension of the equity structure,and analyzes the impact of the introduction of different non-state-owned equity ratios on corporate governance through the method of executive compensation sensitivity.Second,for the issue of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises,most of the existing researches focus on the direction of excess compensation,and less on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance to explore how to improve the internal executive compensation system.From the perspective of sensitivity,study how to improve the executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises.The conclusion of this paper is that the introduction of non-state-owned equity is significantly positively correlated with executive compensation and performance sensitivity.Specifically,the introduction of non-state-owned shares has improved the operating capacity and governance level of China's state-owned enterprises to a certain extent,and thus the salary level of state-owned enterprise executives depends on the performance level of the company in the current year,which improves the performance sensitivity of executive compensation..The application value of this paper lies in:(1)Emphasizing the importance of relaxing non-state-owned capital access standards in the mixed reform and introducing diversified shareholders;(2)proposing opinions and suggestions on improving the executive compensation incentives of state-owned enterprises.