Research On Information Sharing Strategy Of Virtual Product Supply Chain With Uncertain Consumer Preference

With the growth of the virtual economy and the rapid expansion of the virtual goods market,many brands and companies have placed forward-thinking technology concepts such as NFTs,virtual assets,and Metaverse in a more strategic position than ever before.The“brand + platform” virtual product distribution model led by virtual technology platforms has emerged,bringing a series of new virtual experiences to consumers.In this model,the virtual platform,both as a virtual technology provider and as a place where transactions take place,can better capture consumer preferences through digital records.As a result,there is an information asymmetry in the virtual product supply chain,i.e.,the virtual technology platform knows more about consumers’ virtual technology preferences than the brand owners.In addition,the problem of information asymmetry in the supply chain is an important factor that affects the efficiency of enterprise operation and cooperation s well as hinders the future development of enterprises.Information sharing strategy becomes an important tactic to solve the information asymmetry problems in supply chain management and promote win–win cooperation.Considering that consumers have heterogeneous preferences for virtual technologies,we investigate a virtual product supply chain consisting of a brand owner,a virtual technology platform,and consumers(where the virtual technology platform has superior information about consumer preferences).We develop a signaling game model with preference information signaled by the virtual technology investment to study the optimal information-sharing strategy for the virtual product supply chain.Finally,we analyze the "win-win" conditions that benefit both brand owners and virtual technology platforms and the impact on consumer welfare from the perspective of firm efficiency.The conclusions of the study are as follows: First,we find that when consumers are less likely to like virtual technology,virtual technology platforms will increase the virtual technology investment to convince the brand owners that the market has a high preference for virtual products.Second,the virtual technology platforms are always willing to share their superior information with the brand owners,because in the no information-sharing scenario,it will make the high type virtual technology platform pay an information cost to reveal their true information.Third,virtual technology platforms and brands can actually achieve alignment under certain conditions.When consumers are more likely to like virtual technology,information sharing can benefit both the brand owners and the virtual technology platforms simultaneously.We also identify the consumer surplus in equilibrium.When consumers are moderately likely to prefer virtual technology,consumers can gain more benefits in the information sharing scenario.The above findings not only reveal the signal motivation of firms’ virtual technology investment behavior but also provide decision-making guidelines and managerial insights for firms to choose information-sharing strategies in virtual product supply chains.In reality,the information asymmetry problem in a supply chain is very common.The decision making and information sharing strategies of firms need to be considered comprehensively from the perspective of product characteristics and consumers,etc.Furthermore,this study provides novel and interesting research insights and future research directions for supply chain management research.