Research On Model And Simulation Of The Evolution Of Barriers To Two-sided Markets Entry In Considering Unilateral Lock-in

Under the two-sided market structure,the utility of users at one side of the platform will be affected by the size of users at the other end.The lock-in to unilateral users of incumbent platform will enable them to accumulate more users,trigger positive feedback of increasing marginal revenue and decreasing marginal cost and realize capital and cost advantages compared with other platforms.These will lead to structural changes in the whole two-sided market:the evolution of entry barriers to two-sided market.The evolution of barriers to entry in two-sided market is a kind of complex adaptive system,the participants of the three parties also have the characteristics of the subject in the complex adaptive system,which is proactive and adaptable,and can independently realize the information exchange between the subjects and the environment.And the emergence results of macro dimension are generated by the behaviors of the agents in the micro dimension.Based on the theory of complex adaptive system,this paper introduces condition of unilateral lock-in,constructs a systematic two-sided market model,and discusses the evolution of entry barriers under unilateral structural lock-in and unilateral strategical lock-in.Swarm simulation tool is used to simulate the evolution state of entry barriers under unilateral structural lock-in and unilateral strategical lock-in,and the control variables are introduced according to the simulation results to conduct the control simulation analysis of the above two evolution paths.The research mainly includes the following four aspects:(1)Unilateral structural lock-in entry barrier evolution model and simulation research.First of all,this thesis defines the concept of unilateral structural lock-in.It is dissected into linear unilateral structural lock-in and network unilateral structural lock-in and the interactive relationship between two-sided market under the two kinds of lock-in is analyzed.Abstract the two-sided market transaction and competition system in reality,design the attributes information and behavior strategy of the classes of platforms,consumers and sellers,the ABS simulation model is built.Then,Swarm simulation tool is used to simulate the evolution state of barriers to entry under linear unilateral lock-in and network unilateral lock-in,and the eigenvalues causing the state changes are observed.Finally,based on the eigenvalues,the results are analyzed and the relevant enlightenments are obtained.(2)Regulation of the simulation study of structural lock-in entry barrier evolution.According to the evolution simulation results of unilateral structural lock-in entry barriers,the evolution state of entry barriers is analyzed.Regulators were introduced and the platform payment compatibility,transparency and tax are selected as regulatory variables.Through several simulation and regulation experiments,the results are analyzed and inspirations is obtained.(3)Unilateral strategical lock-in entry barrier generation model and simulation research.First of all,this thesis defines the concept of unilateral strategical lock-in,the interactive relationship between two-sided market agents under unilateral strategical lock-in is analyzed,and the generation model of two-sided market entry barriers including the classes of platforms,consumers and sellers are constructed.Then,swarm simulation tool is used to simulate the evolution state of entry barriers under the different eigenvalues of the strategies of platform.After several simulation experiments,the variables causing entry barriers are selected.Finally,according to the obtained variables,the results are analyzed and the relevant management inspirations are obtained.(4)Simulation study on the evolutionary regulation of entry barrier of unilateral strategical lock-in.According to the evolution simulation results of unilateral strategical lock-in entry barriers,the evolution state of entry barriers under platform strategy is analyzed.Regulators are introduced,platform disciplinary fee,consumer rationality and platform entry fee are selected as regulatory variables to conduct regulation simulation.Through several simulation experiments,the regulation effect is observed and relevant enlightenments are obtained.