Research On Evolutionary Game And Simulation Of Government-Enterprise-University Collaborative Innovation Under Science And Technology Commissioners System

With the gradual strengthening of the trend of economic globalization,new forms of interactive development have emerged in various industries,various industries are showing a new format of interactive development.Enterprise technological innovation has become the key measure for its numerical transformation and high-quality development.As an important mode of enterprise innovation,the collaborative innovation between government and enterprises under the system of science and technology commissioners has become a new way to solve the problem of enterprise innovation,which plays an important role in building an innovative country and driving the high-quality development of enterprises.However,as an excellent collaborative innovation model,the efficiency of the whole collaborative innovation system is not ideal.In the face of the demand of new business development mode and its low innovation benefit status,it is very important to explore the influence mechanism of school-enterprise collaborative innovation system operation,reveal the reasons of poor system efficiency and design reasonable related incentive policies.The collaborative innovation process of government,industry and university is a comprehensive system involving many subjects and factors.In order to promote the efficient operation of collaborative innovation,this thesis constructs a theoretical model of interaction between various subjects and many influencing factors by means of system dynamics method,and clarifies the important nodes and key influencing factors in the process of collaborative innovation of government,industry and university.The specific research contents of this thesis are as follows:1.Description of the characteristics and development process of the science and technology correspondent system.According to the bibliometric theory and method,Cite Space software is used to make a bibliometric visual analysis of the development trend and research hotspots in the field of government-enterprise collaborative innovation,and the influencing factors of collaborative innovation are summarized.The composition of government-enterprise collaborative innovation system is analyzed,and the internal operation mode of collaborative innovation system is expounded,and the government-enterprise collaborative innovation model with market mechanism and government participation is constructed.2.Considering the evolutionary game study of collaborative innovation between universities and enterprises.Based on evolutionary game theory,this thesis constructs an evolutionary game model between universities and enterprises in collaborative innovation system,and explores the mechanism and evolutionary path of each participant in collaborative innovation.On this basis,the m-ABM simulation model is built based on Netlogo simulation platform to verify the effectiveness of strategy selection of collaborative innovation participants in different situations.And use Netlogo to simulate the influence of different influencing factors on collaborative innovation.The research shows that when the cost of collaborative innovation is low,universities and enterprises will evolve in the direction of active cooperation,and with the reduction of the cost of collaborative innovation,the faster the rate of enterprises and universities actively participating in collaborative innovation will reach a steady state,and the investment of both partners in collaborative innovation will be less,while the benefits from active participation in collaborative innovation will be far greater than the investment in collaborative innovation,which can effectively improve the enthusiasm of both partners in collaborative innovation.When the cost of collaborative innovation is high,the benefit of collaborative innovation between enterprises and universities is less than the cost of cooperation,and both partners choose to participate in collaborative innovation passively.When the risk of technology leakage of both parties in collaborative innovation is low,universities and enterprises evolve towards active cooperation.At this time,the benefits and technical benefits of active cooperation between universities and enterprises are greater than the risk of technology leakage.When the benefits of universities and enterprises themselves are large,both sides of the cooperative subjects choose active cooperation,and with the increase of benefits,the faster the evolution towards active cooperation,and finally the balance is reached.3.The strategy choice of universities and enterprises with government participation.In order to further explore the influence of various influencing factors on the strategy choice among participants under government participation.Based on the evolutionary game between universities and enterprises,the tripartite evolutionary game of government,enterprise and learning is constructed.Using Netlogo platform to develop m-ABM simulation model to analyze the situation stability of the tripartite evolutionary game of government,enterprise and learning,and using Python to carry out numerical simulation analysis,respectively,to explore how universities and enterprises will choose their own strategies under different government punishments and subsidies.The research shows that,compared with the market mechanism,collaborative innovation between enterprises and universities with government participation can encourage enterprises and universities to actively participate in collaborative innovation,improve the performance of collaborative innovation in Industry-University-Research,and then promote the high-quality transformation of enterprises.There is a certain threshold effect of government subsidies.When the government subsidies to universities and enterprises are small,enterprises and universities choose to participate passively in collaborative innovation.When the government subsidies are moderate,both partners of collaborative innovation choose to actively participate in collaborative innovation,and with the increase of subsidies,enterprises and universities will evolve towards active cooperation faster until reaching a stable state.When the subsidies are large,they choose passive supervision because the government only pays too much.The government’s punishment can effectively promote the selection of active cooperation strategies between science and technology commissioners and enterprises.When the punishment is strong,universities and enterprises evolve towards active cooperation,and the stronger the punishment is,the faster the cooperative parties evolve towards active cooperation,and finally reach a stable state.When the punishment is weak,the cost and technology leakage risk of active cooperation between universities and enterprises are greater than the government’s punishment,and the researchers and enterprises choose negative cooperation.