| In the grass-roots political structure of township and village governance,the Baocun cadres of villages and towns are the most important group of grassroots cadres and the bridge and link between the party and the masses,the country and society.The choice of their work methods and the level of their work efficiency are related to the implementation of the party and national policies and the people’s recognition of the party and the country.With the deepening of the work of rural revitalization,the importance of the Baocun cadres has become increasingly prominent.However,in practical work,due to the characteristics of multiple identities,non-institutionalized working methods and strong mobility of the Baocun cadres,there are some phenomena such as perfunctory responsibility,passive inaction,arranged replacement,the village and township cadres unable to play an effective role in political communication.Under the background of comprehensively promoting rural revitalization,it is of great significance to deeply analyze the behavioral logic of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages,explore the gap between their actual operation and the policy requirements and the influencing factors,to understand the interaction between the state and society,and to improve the rural grass-roots governance capacity and the modernization of the governance system in China.Based on the case study of the daily work of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages,C Town,Shanxi Province,from the perspective of behaviorism,this paper discusses the behavioral logic of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages.Through the analysis of the daily behavior of the Baocun cadres in the villages of townships and towns,it is found that there is a mismatch between the system arrangement and the system implementation in the operation process of the Baocun cadres in the villages of townships and towns.Based on the thinking of this paradox,through the deep description of the case,this paper analyzes the responsibility,relationship,governance and system on the behavior of Baocun cadres in townships and villages,and puts forward an institutionalized mechanism to effectively regulate the behavior of the Baocun cadres in villages and towns.This paper consists of three parts: introduction,text and conclusion.The introduction discusses the origin and significance of the research,analyzes the current research situation at home and abroad,puts forward research questions and assumptions,explains the research methods and innovation points,combs research ideas and structures,and clarifies relevant concepts.The text is divided into four chapters.Focusing on the problem consciousness of "why the township the Baocun cadres of townships and villages passively implement the policies of the grass-roots government",this paper analyzes the game path of the leaders of townships and villages,townships and villages cadres and the two committees of the village,clarifies the roles,responsibilities and authorities of the leaders of townships and villages,townships and villages cadres and the two committees of the village,explores how to limit the powers and responsibilities to better play the advantages of the system,and discusses the behavioral logic of the township cadres of townships and villages.The first part introduces and analyzes the evolution of the Baocun cadres system in the township and village,and believes that the establishment of the township and village cadres has a long history.There are also hierarchical divisions within the township and village cadres,and this level division is perfectly integrated into the township government system.The existence of the Baocun cadres is the result of institutional changes.The second part discusses the behavioral logic of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages from the perspective of "should be".The identity of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages should meet the three criteria of the effectiveness of policy implementation,the smoothness of policy communication and the supervision of the development of affairs.Only in this way can the effectiveness of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages be judged strictly,fairly and convincingly.The third part describes the behavior logic of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages from the reality level.The passive governance behavior of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages is inherent logic.There are obvious differences between the selective behavior of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages under economic man,the strategic behavior of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages under opportunity cost,and the collusion coping behavior and the necessary behavior of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages under limited power.The fourth part puts forward the institutionalized mechanism of regulating the behavior of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages from the system level.This part mainly starts from three aspects: appointment exchange mechanism,assessment and incentive mechanism,accountability and fault tolerance and error correction mechanism,clarifies the power and responsibility of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages,and institutionalizes the behavior of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages.On the basis of the analysis and study of the case of the behavior of the Baocun cadres in the townships and villages,this paper finally puts forward several issues that need further study: First,the criteria for defining the active political behavior and passive governance behavior of the Baocun cadres in townships and villages and the concealment of the behavior subject in the process of investigation need further demonstration and investigation.Second,the mechanism of unclear power and responsibility of township governments needs to be analyzed from the perspective of financial power and political power. |