Study On The Interest Coordination Of Relevant Parties In Energy-saving Retrofit PPP Projects Of Existing Buildings

In order to achieve the goal of energy saving and emission reduction,urban renewal is on the agenda of many countries.The PPP project of energy-saving retrofit of existing buildings is one of the most important projects in urban renewal.However,the implementation of PPP-BR projects is far from being as effective as imagined,and according to the National Housing and Construction Commission,only 7% of the more than 10,000 green energy retrofit projects that existed in China by the end of 2017 were able to meet green energy efficiency operation standards.The main reason for this is that PPP-BR projects have problems of uncoordinated interests and inactive cooperation among stakeholders in practice,leading to inefficient and problematic projects.Therefore,how to promote the coordination of the interests of the parties involved in the energysaving retrofit PPP projects of existing buildings is the key to achieving high quality energy saving.This thesis focuses on the current problem of energy-saving retrofitting projects that are difficult to achieve high-quality energy-saving operation standards,and aims to promote the coordination of interests of stakeholders in the energy-saving retrofit PPP projects of existing buildings,combining stakeholder theory,incentive theory,evolutionary game,principal-agent theory,etc.,and establishing corresponding models from two perspectives of distribution dimension and incentive dimension respectively to carry out coordination analysis of various interest subjects:First,we summarize the interests and responsibilities of the stakeholders,analyze the conflict of interests among the stakeholders in the energy-saving retrofit PPP projects of existing buildings,identify the root causes of the conflict,and propose a framework for resolving the conflict and realizing the coordination of the interests of the stakeholders.The analysis shows the main source of conflict comes from the insufficient motivation of cooperation among interest subjects and the frequent occurrence of opportunistic behavior,and the conflict can be solved from two dimensions of benefit risk distribution and incentive constraints to achieve the coordination of interests of each subject.Secondly,a tripartite evolutionary game model based on benefit-risk distribution is constructed from the distribution dimension to analyze the coordination of interests of interest subjects in the PPP project of energy-saving renovation of existing buildings,mainly to solve the uncoordinated problems arising from the lack of cooperation motivation among interest subjects The study concludes that benefit distribution,risk sharing,government incentives and penalties,and regulatory measures are the main factors that influence stakeholders to actively cooperate to achieve benefit coordination,and are the decision basis for the strategy selection of interest subjects.Scientific distribution of benefits,increasing risk-bearing coefficients within a reasonable range,and improving incentives and regulations can improve the motivation of cooperation among subjects,reduce the worry of unstable earnings,and effectively promote the coordination of interests of all participants in PPP-BR projects.It is found that social capital is more sensitive to changes in parameters such as incentive and constraint strength and benefit allocation ratio and risk-bearing coefficient,and is more willing to choose active strategies when the parameters increase compared to users.Finally,the incentive constraint model is constructed from the incentive dimension to analyze the coordination of interests of interest subjects in the energy-saving retrofit PPP projects of existing buildings,mainly to solve the uncoordinated problem of frequent opportunistic behaviors due to information asymmetry.The study concludes that the risk perception,ability level,and benefit distribution ratio of social capital are important factors affecting the incentive level,and the incentive constraint mechanism should be set according to the specific conditions of social capital in order to effectively inhibit the opportunistic behavior of social capital and maximize the comprehensive benefits.At the same time,the weight of economic benefits and external effects should be fully considered,and the feedback of residents’ opinions should be combined to make the incentive and restraint mechanism design more scientific and reasonable and promote the coordination of interests among interest subjects.