Research On Pricing And Coordination Of Power Battery Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Uncertainty Of Recycling Quality

With the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry in recent years,the first wave of power battery retirement has come.How to deal with these retired power batteries is receiving more and more attention.Some countries have issued policies related to power battery recycling,and enterprises are also actively exploring the reverse recycling supply chain of power batteries.As the largest power battery manufacturer in the world at present,according to the current mainstream extended producer responsibility system(EPR),Company N has the responsibility to build closed-loop processing of its own products.This responsibility for recycling will also become more and more clear with the maturity of the industry in the future.At the same time,due to the rising cost of power battery raw materials and the increased supply instability caused by the epidemic in recent years,Company N has also become more motivated and has begun to try to build a closedloop supply chain of power battery to fulfill its recycling responsibilities and reduce production costs.Firstly,the paper analyzes the current situation of power battery business and recycling of N Company,focusing on the main problems existing in the operation of power battery closed-loop supply chain,including how to coordinate the conflict of interests of different companies in the closed-loop supply chain and mobilize the enthusiasm of recycling,the recycling management problems caused by the uncertainty of recycling quality,and the impact of government subsidies on the efficiency of power battery closed-loop supply chain operation.Then,considering the significant uncertainty of the quality of the recycled power batteries,it is necessary to reasonably determine the judgment standard of the recycling quality,and adopt three treatment methods of cascade utilization,recycling and harmless treatment to maximize the utilization value of the recycled batteries.Based on this,considering the uncertainty of recycling quality,a Stackelberg game model of closed-loop supply chain consisting of power battery manufacturer Company N,vehicle manufacturer,and third-party battery recycler is constructed.The two cases of centralized and decentralized decision-making by supply chain members are discussed respectively,and the optimal solution of the analytical solution is obtained through the backward induction.After that,through the comparison of numerical analysis,it is found that there is still much room for improvement in the total recycling quantity and total profit under the decentralized decision-making situation.Then,the closed-loop supply chain is further optimized through external coordination(government subsidies)and internal coordination(contracts).The study found that the method of subsidizing Company N by the government can effectively improve the profit and environmental benefits of the supply chain,and at the same time mobilize the recycling willingness of all members.The cost sharing and income sharing contracts will continue to be introduced under the government subsidy.The comparative analysis shows that the adjusted income sharing contract under the situation of subsidizing manufacturer can bring more obvious optimization effects.Finally,based on the model results and the actual situation of Company N,the corresponding management suggestions are given.