Research On Green Supply Chain Technology Investment Based On Policy And Learning Effect

With the increasingly serious environmental problems and the need for sustainable social development,the development of green supply chain is imminent.In order to meet the management needs of low carbon and green products and lean operation of enterprises,this paper takes the manufacturer’s technology investment in the supply chain as the main research point,and considers the external factors of government intervention(subsidy policy and reward policy)and the internal factors of cost learning effect respectively from the perspective of investment cost and production cost.This paper studies the impact of internal and external factors on the overall energy efficiency level and efficiency of green supply chain,which is of great significance for policy makers and product manufacturers to improve the product energy efficiency and operation efficiency of green supply chain.The specific contents are as follows:In view of the external factors of government intervention(subsidy policy and reward policy),a two-level supply chain system composed of manufacturers and retailers is constructed.Important factors such as the impact of technology investment on energy efficiency level,the operational efficiency of enterprises and the sensitivity coefficient of energy efficiency level to consumers are considered.Through Stackelberg game and Cournot game,the equilibrium decision,profit and social welfare of three different power structures in supply chain(manufacturer leader,retailer leader and equal power of both sides)are analyzed and compared in subsidy policy and reward policy.The main conclusions show that both subsidy policy and incentive policy can promote manufacturers’ technology investment behavior and increase supply chain profits.With the increase of government intervention level,social welfare will increase first and then decrease.Aiming at the internal factors of cost learning effect,a two-stage dynamic game decision model of manufacturer and retailer is constructed.Some important factors,such as cost learning efficiency,sensitivity of energy efficiency level and cost coefficient of energy efficiency investment,are considered,and both short-sighted decision makers and strategic decision makers are considered.By means of the Game theory,this paper analyzes and compares the equilibrium decisions,profits and supply chain efficiency of manufacturers and retailers under centralized and decentralized,myopic and strategic decision-making models.The main results show that the cost learning effect has a positive effect on supply chain technology investment,pricing and order quantity.Compared with the supply chain efficiency under myopic behavior,the decentralized decision-making scenario has lower supply chain efficiency.Cost learning efficiency and energy efficiency sensitivity are positively correlated with supply chain profit,and negatively correlated with supply chain efficiency.The main contribution of this paper is to focus on the investment cost problem in the supply chain and explore the driving factors of green supply chain technology investment from the external cause of government intervention and the internal cause of cost learning effect.Based on the reality,the impact of technology investment on product energy efficiency level,the inefficiency of enterprise operation,the government’s one-time subsidy to enterprise technology investment,the government’s reward based on product energy efficiency level and sales volume,and the cost learning effect based on product ordered quantity in the production process of enterprise are considered.At the same time,the short-sighted behavior and strategic behavior decision of decision makers are considered,which provides a reference direction for the technology investment problems in the field of green supply chain management,and how to make decisions when enterprises respond to different policies.It provides a theoretical basis for how the government intervenes in different supply chain systems and the degree of intervention.