Optimal Strategies Of Waste Recycling Manufacturing,product Production Pricing And Government Subsidy In Green Supply Chain

Nowadays,with the increasingly serious energy crisis and environmental problems,the greening of supply chain has attracted worldwide attention.However,the development of green products is faced with a series of problems such as insufficient supply of raw materials,backward production technology,uncertainty of matching degree between products and consumers.Based on the practice of green supply chain,this dissertation constructs a game model involving government,manufacturer,retailer and third-party recycler,and studies the operation decisions including waste recycling manufacturing,technology improvement and product pricing,and investigates the role of government subsidy.The specific contents and relevant conclusions are as follows:First,this dissertation investigates the incentive effects of the two widely-used subsidy modes(raw material price subsidy and finished product sale subsidy)under asymmetric information.Using principal-agent contract,a game model is established in a management system composed of the government and a manufacturer,where the conversion rate from waste to final product is manufacturer’s private information.Results show that the two subsidy modes have the same performance under symmetric information,while under asymmetric information the government always prefers the raw material price subsidy which is more environmental-friendly.Besides,if the average conversion rate is large or the uncertainty level of the asymmetric information is moderate,the raw material price subsidy is Pareto-improving compared with the finished product sale subsidy for the government and the high-type manufacturer.Only when the average conversion rate is small or the uncertainty level is very small/very large,the high-type manufacturer welcomes the finished product sale subsidy.Second,this dissertation investigates the effects of subsidy object and recycling mode of waste on the effectiveness of recycling activity.The government can provide subsidies to the manufacturer or the recycler,and the manufacturer can complete the recycling activity herself or entrust an independent recycler.Considering the asymmetric cost information,a game model is established in a reverse supply chain which includes the government,manufacturer and recycler,and conclusions can be drawn by analyzing and comparing different strategies: the strategy that the government subsidizes manufacturer and the manufacturer entrusts recycler to collect waste,is preferred by both the government and the manufacturer due to the higher recycling quantity and profits.Furthermore,the three players are all inclined to the above-mentioned strategy when the recycling cost is relatively small.The total collected quantity will decrease when the information is asymmetric,which makes the supply chain less-efficient.Third,this dissertation explores the equilibrium solutions that the two symmetric manufacturers can reach on their technology improvement strategies,and analyzes the role of government subsidy.The game models without and with government subsidy are established respectively,and the results are compared to analyze the role of government subsidy.Results show that both manufacturers apply the existing technology when it is obviously costly to improve technology,and both improve technology when the benefit of market expansion is relatively large,while they reach an asymmetric equilibrium with one improving technology and the other not when the cost and the market expansion associated with improving technology can match each other.Besides,the two manufacturers may trap into a prisoner’s dilemma when they reach the equilibrium of both improving the technology.Encouragingly,government subsidy can serve as an effective way to alleviate the prisoner’s dilemma by easing manufacturers’ financial burden for technology improvement.In addition,government subsidy is conducive to expanding the green product market and improving the social welfare.Finally,this dissertation explores the manufacturer’s pricing strategy of green products and the effect of government subsidy with considering the retailer’s co-development when the matching degree information is uncertain and asymmetric.A game model between both players is established,and the following conclusions can be obtained: without co-development,when the matching degree is more likely to be low,the manufacturer is severely damaged from the asymmetric information and prefers the preannounced pricing strategy;otherwise,he prefers the responsive pricing strategy.Co-development will alter the manufacturer’s preference for the pricing strategy,making him always prefer the preannounced pricing mode.In addition,co-development leads to a “win-win”outcome for both players when their respective fixed costs are relatively low under the equilibrium pricing strategy.Specially,when the responsive pricing strategy is exogenously applied,the manufacturer is more inclined to launch co-development when the matching degree is more likely to be high.The retailer may suffer from it when the matching degree is more likely to be low or the fixed cost is higher.Government subsidy can lead to higher product quality,profits of participants and social welfare.