Evaluation On Policy Effects Of Tradable Green Certificates Based On Power Market Supply Chain Game

In the context of the deepening reform of the power system,important breakthroughs have been made in key content such as trans mission and distribution pricing,the construction of electricity spot market,and the significant increase in the proportion of market-based transactions,bringing strong support for the development of energy conservation and pollution reduction in the power system.While China’s power market construction has achieved remarkable results,it also faces multiple challenges such as simultaneous development of inter-provincial and intra-provincial market construction,intensified conflict of interests of marke t players,and clean and low-carbon energy transformation.With the increasing shortage of fossil fuels and environmental pollution,the development of renewable energy that relies on the characteristics of environmental friendliness and sustainability has received increasingly attention.In 2017,China began to implement green certificate subscription,which means that the construction of the power market and the market-oriented consumption mechanism of renewable energy are promoted simultaneously,and coordination of the complex interaction between the tradable green certificates system and the power market is the primary consider ation.According to the idea of "control the middle,let go of the two ends",based on the game relationship between the stakeholders of the power market supply chain,the research focus of this paper is to explore the mechanism and policy effects of the tradable green certificates system from the perspective of economics.Based on the above background,the core content of this paper is as follows: 1.Relying on the tradable green certificates system,power market theory,game analysis of the power market supply chain and the meaning and content of the effect evaluation of environmental regulation policy,this paper takes the bilat eral contracts market,electricity spot market,and hybrid electricity market supply chain structure and transaction mechanism as the research basis.The relevant parameters of the tradable green certificate system are introduced,and the utility function is used to construct a power market supply chain game model including conventional energy power generation enterprises,renewable energy power generation enterprises,and consumers.Based on the game equilibrium of the power market supply chain,this paper studies the mechanism of the tradable green certificates system on the main strategies of the power market supply chain,and analyzes the policy effects of the tradable green certificate system.2.According to the actual operation data of China’s power market,this paper simulates the game equilibrium of three power market supply chains and their policy effects under the tradable green certificates system,and analyzes the changes in the equilibrium results of the power market supply chain game when the fine parameters and renewable energy quotas change.And under the condition of a certain penalty parameter,the impact of differen t renewable energy quotas on the green certificates price,the amount of renewable energy and social welfare under the three power market trading modes is compared,so as to realize the verification of the action mechanism and policy effects of the tradabl e green certificates system.The research results are as follows: 1.When the quota is fixed,fine parameters are positively correlated with the amount of renewable energy and green certificates prices under the three power market transaction modes,and finally stabilizes.Increasing the penalties for renewable energy consumption will help urge consumers to fulfill their obligations of renewable energy consumption and increase the enthusiasm of consumers to participate in green certificates transactions.2.When the fine parameter is fixed,with the increase of the quota,the price of renewable energy and green certificates in the three power market trading modes will first increase and then decrease.The increase of the social welfare function with respect to the quota presents an inverted "U"-shaped distribution,and the social welfare reaches the optimal level when the quota is about 0.5.3.The price of green certificates and the amount of renewable energy in the hybrid electricity market are lower than t he values in the single bilateral contracts market and the electricity spot market.When the quota is low,the social welfare level of the single bilateral contracts market and the electricity spot market is higher than that of the hybrid electricity marke t,and when the quota is high,the social welfare level of the hybrid electricity market is higher.4.In the hybrid electricity market,with the continuous increase of quotas,the proportion of optimal traded electricity in the bilateral contracts market shows an increasing trend,but it is still smaller than the optimal traded electricity proportion in the electricity spot market.And when the social welfare is the largest,the ratio of optimal transaction electricity between the electricity spot market a nd the bilateral contracts market can reach about 9:1.It shows that the addition of the spot trading mode stimulates the full competition of market transactions,realizes the rational distribution of power resources,and improves the level of economic and social welfare.Finally,according to the research results,this paper puts forward relevant measures and policy suggestions for the implementation of the tradable green certificates system and the construction of China’s power market.