Study On The Impact Of Different Environmentaleconomic Policies On The Green Behavior Offirms In The Supply Chain Based On Game Theoryperspective

At present,China is in the transformation of the development mode and optimize the economic structure of the offensive period.The traditional"ecological resources-products-pollution emissions"rough development model is no longer in line with the development of the times,bringing great damage to the ecological environment.As a microscopic subject of market economy,enterprises are also the biggest environmental polluters while promoting economic development,and they should take up the social responsibility of pollution control and environmental protection to promote their owngreendevelopment.However,intheprocessofgreendevelopmentofenterprises,theyoftenface problems such as financial constraints and unsound market for green products,which inhibit their green development.As the first responsible person for improving the environment and preventing pollution,our government has been constantly promoting green and low-carbon innovation in enterprises.However,in recent years,the government has brought a large financial pressure on itself while promoting environmental management through the implementation of environmental economic policies.Therefore,in the face of the increasingly serious social environmental governance needs,the pain points of enterprises’green development and the financial pressure of government policy implementation,we need to analyze in depth the impact mechanism and practical effects of China’s environmental economic policies on enterprises’green behavior.What kind of effects do different environmental economic policies have on the green behavior of enterprises?How to improve the efficiency of the utilization of resources and the precision of the implementation of environmentaleconomicpolicies?Based on the above background,this paper constructs a secondary supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.Under the scenario that the manufacturer is short of capital due to green innovation investment,three different policy scenarios are considered:a single environmentaleconomicpolicy ofgreen credit,a compositeenvironmental economicpolicy ofgreen creditanddifferentiallyweightedsubsidies,anda compositeenvironmental economicpolicyofgreen credit and government green procurement,and the effects of different environmental economic policies on the manufacturer’s green innovation investment,production,pricing behavior and profit,theretailer’spricing,orderingbehaviorandprofit,andtheconsumer’smarketdemandareinvestigated.The impact of different environmental economic policies on manufacturers’green innovation investment,production,pricing behavior and profits,retailers’pricing,ordering behavior and profits,and consumers’market demand is investigated.In addition,this paper compares and analyzes the impact effects of different environmental economic policy scenarios from two perspectives:a single environmental economic policy and a composite environmental economic policy with the same government expenditure.Finally,this paper uses Matlab2020b to conduct numerical simulation analysis on the sensitivity and model comparison of the optimal values of different environmental economicpolicymodels.The results of the study showed that:(1)Manufacturers’green innovation investments have positive externalities in all three environmental economic policy scenarios,and the increase in green credit incentives stimulates manufacturers to invest more in green innovation.However,it also increases the wholesale and sales pricing of products,when consumers can accept the increase in product prices due to the increased greenness.Thus,increased green credit incentives also increase consumer market demand,stimulate retailer ordering and manufacturer production,and thus increase manufacturer profits.However,the two compound environmental economic policies have different mechanisms ofimpact.(1)In thecaseofgreencredit anddifferentialweightedgovernmentsubsidies.Regarding the impact of product subsidies.An increase in product subsidies provides incentives for manufacturers to invest more in green innovation,and manufacturers and retailers can adjust their product pricing according to consumers’green and low-carbon preferences,thereby increasing consumer market demand and their own revenue.The effect of subsidy weighting.This paper finds that subsidy weights do not affect manufacturers’green innovation investment and production or retailers’ordering behavior.As longas the government determines the amount ofproduct subsidies,it determines the long-term product greenness,manufacturers’production demand and consumer market demand,as well as manufacturers’and retailers’ultimate revenue.(2)In the green credit and government green procurement scenarios,an increase in the size of government procurement can stimulate manufacturers to invest in green innovation and increase profits.However,the green and low-carbon preference of consumers affects the implementation effect of government green procurement policy,and there is a threshold valuek~2(28)2L.When the green and low-carbon preference of consumers is below the threshold value,the increase of government procurement scale willincreasethewholesaleandsalespricingofproducts,resultinginthedecreaseofconsumermarket demand;when the green and low-carbon preference of consumers is greaterthan the threshold value,the increase of government procurement scale will increase the wholesale and sales pricing of products,but also increase the greenness of products,which will increase the consumer market demand.When consumers’green preference is greater than the threshold,the increase in the scale of government procurement increases the wholesale pricing and sales pricing of products,but also increases the greenness of products,and then consumers prefer products with high greenness,which increasesthedemandofconsumermarket.(2)Comparing the single environmental economic policy with the composite environmental economicpolicy scenarioyields:(1)Compared to thesingle environmentaleconomic policy ofgreen credit,the compound environmental economic policy of increasing differential weighting subsidies can improve the green innovation investment and production behavior and returns of manufacturers,thereturns of retailers,andconsumer marketdemand.When consumers have not formed the concept of green consumption,that is,k ~2<L,the government’s policy of increasing differential weighting subsidies is beneficial to consumers,when consumers actually purchase products at lower prices,but the lower actual purchase prices of consumers do not affect the profits of manufacturers and retailers,which will facilitate the pre-development of green low-carbon products,effectively stimulate consumers’green consumption,and further promote manufacturers and retailers’green behavior.(2)Compared to a single green credit environmental economic policy,a compound environmental economic policy of increased government green procurement can increase manufacturers’green innovation investment,pricing and their own profits,and retailers’pricing behavior.However,it is unfavorable for the government to increase green procurement policy when consumer green low-carbon preferences are low,that is,k ~2<2L.Although it stimulates manufacturers’green innovation investmentbehavior,it reduces consumers’green consumption demand and will be detrimental to the long-term development of green low-carbon products.Only when consumer green low-carbon preferences are high,that is,k ~2>2L,increased government green procurement can effectively stimulate consumer market demand and play a leading role in further stimulating the green behavior ofmanufacturersandretailers.Regardingtheimpactonretailers’profits,wealsofoundthatonlywhen consumers’green and low-carbon preferences are high,that is,k ~2>2L,the government’s compound environmental economic policy of increasing green procurement is effective in increasing retailers’profits,and when consumers’green and low-carbon preferences are low,the government’s green procurement policy tends to trigger a policy implementation"trap"that causes deviations in policy implementationexpectationsandresults.Government expenditures comparing two compound environmental economic policies simultaneously yielded:(1)The difference between product greenness and manufacturer’s profit is at the threshold.When consumer greenness preference is less than the threshold,government green procurement compound environmental economic policy stimulates manufacturers to invest in green innovation morethandifferentially weighted subsidy compound environmental economic policy,and government policy is more green and low-carbon efficient;the opposite is true when consumer greenness preference is greater than the threshold.Also higher green innovation investments by manufacturers bring higher benefits to them.(2)From the perspective of consumption of green low-carbon products,the government differential weight subsidy compound environmental economy policy can stimulate consumers to consume green through lower actual consumer purchase prices,thus promoting manufacturers’production and retailers’ordering behavior as well as increasing retailers’profits compared to the government green procurement compound environmental economy policy.