| The acceleration of urbanization process and social development has intensified the environmental pollution level of the construction industry,which brings huge challenges to the environmental pollution supervision of construction projects.With the development of the platform economy and digital technology tools,environmental pollution supervision has gradually shifted from offline to online,and a third-party supervision platform for environmental pollution of construction projects has emerged.The third-party supervision platform has become the main force in the supervision for environmental pollution of construction projects because it can effectively solve the obstacles such as information asymmetry,moral hazard,and adverse selection.Due to existences of characteristics of environmental pollution public goods and the public service attributes of the supervision platform,the supervision platform cannot only rely on the setting of mechanisms and price structures to develop continuously like other industry platforms.To promote the healthy operation of the platform,the government chooses to implement supportive policies,but the existing literature has not conducted an in-depth analysis of its platformization process and price structure setting in combination with the policies.Therefore,this research aims at the third-party supervision platform for environmental pollution of construction projects,explores the effect and path of policies in the process of platformization and the setting of price structure,and promotes the formulation of reasonable government policies,the breakthrough of critical capacity and the sustainable and healthy development of the platform.Firstly,based on comparing the strategy choices of the government and third-party platform companies under different policies based on a static game model of complete information,this research discusses the optimal cost allocation strategy in the platformization process.After the platform put into markets,the platform model is analyzed based on the platform economic theory and the unique attributes of the thirdparty supervision platform.Secondly,on the foundation of introducing reward and punishment policies into the Armstrong benchmark pricing model,this research builds a price structure model that only charges registration fees,only transaction fees,and a two-part charging system.Then,the influencing factors of the price structure under different pricing methods and effects of reward and punishment policies are focused on while solving optimal cost combinations.Finally,this study selects the Nanjing construction site smart supervision platform for case analysis,and deconstructs its platformization cost allocation and platform model.Subsequently,according to the actual situation,the price structure model which only charges registration fees is built,and certain pricing suggestions because of pricing analysis has been provided.The research shows that:(1)The optimal allocation strategy of the platform cost is that the government adopts the policy of reward and punishment to bear the risk cost of platform access,while the third-party platform companies is responsible for the platform construction and operation cost in the cooperation.(2)No matter what pricing method is adopted,the optimal combination of fees for a third-party surpervision platform for environmental pollution of construction projects is related to the cost of the platform’s services,the scale of bilateral users,network externalities,utility elasticity(exist only when the platform’s profits are maximized),and policy strength.(3)The platformization process and price structure setting of the third-party supervision platform are inseparable from the support of reward and punishment policies,and through the intermediary of network externalities,user scale and transaction times to act on the optimal combination of fees.Appropriate selection of policy types and rational setting of policy strength can realize the interests of the platform and maximization of public value. |
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