Research On Influencing Factors Of Safety Production Governance

At present,my country’s economic development has entered a period of stability,and we have also put forward new requirements for the quality of development in the new period.Work safety issues not only threaten the safety of people’s lives and property,but are also closely related to social stability and government credibility.Therefore,in recent years,the central government has paid more and more attention to safety production issues.Although the overall level of production safety in my country has been significantly improved,the problem of production safety is still complicated and severe.How to effectively improve the performance of local safety production governance is a problem that the government and academia need to solve at this stage.Therefore,this research is based on the provincial panel data from 2003 to 2017 to conduct an empirical analysis of the factors that affect the performance of safety production governance.First of all,this study uses the super-efficiency SBM model to construct a comprehensive index to measure the performance of safety production governance based on the three vector dimensions of resource input,expected output,and undesired output.And on this basis,from the three different perspectives of economic development,institutional measures,and official characteristics,a comprehensive regression analysis of the influencing factors of safety production governance performance is carried out,and the following conclusions are obtained: First,economic development has a significant impact on safety production governance performance.Significantly positive effect,the advanced industrial structure plays an important role in it.The better the advanced level of the industrial structure,the higher the governance performance,but the gap brought by the advanced industrial structure will gradually shrink with the further development of the economy.Second,in terms of institutional measures,investment in technology and equipment can effectively improve the performance of safety production governance,but the establishment of laws and regulations and safety inspections have little effect.At this stage,the construction of safety production laws and regulations is not perfect.The legal constraints are concentrated on the most basic technical operation specifications and the lack of a legal framework for safety production supervision and management and administrative punishment is an important reason for the insignificant results of the two.Third,in terms of the personal characteristics of officials,the larger the relative age difference of officials,the younger the better the governance performance,and the longer the official tenure,the worse the governance performance.This result is still valid after regression analysis using dummy variables of whether the official’s age is over 60 and whether the official is in the fifth year of the term of office in the robustness test.This article provides a reasonable explanation of the results from the perspective of promotion incentives and collusion between government and enterprise.The younger the officials are,the more likely they are to be promoted,so they are more motivated to improve performance.The collusion between government and enterprise has an important relationship with the stability of officials.Therefore,the longer the tenure,the more stable the collusion relationship will occur,which will lead to poor performance.Fourth,further adjustment analysis shows that the interaction between security inspections and the relative age difference of officials is significant.The moderating effect diagram shows that the younger the official,the better the safety inspection effect.After replacing it with the dummy variable of whether the official’s age is over 60 years old,similar results were also obtained.This result provides a new explanation for the fact that safety inspection has no significant impact on governance performance in the regression of main effects: safety inspection measures are easily affected by officials’ behavioral decisions.When officials are younger and face higher opportunities for promotion,they are more motivated to improve performance,so as to effectively implement safety inspections.When officials are older,especially close to the retirement age,officials lack governance motivation due to narrow promotion space and are more likely to be captured by companies at this time.When “collusion” results in safety inspections and other regulatory measures,the enforcement of regulatory measures will be significantly reduced and cannot be effective at this time.Improve performance.Based on the above empirical research results,this article also puts forward relevant policy recommendations for effectively improving the performance of safety production governance.Reasonably optimizing the industrial structure,attaching importance to safety technology research and development and equipment investment,improving safety production laws and regulations,and establishing a stable and independent safety production regulatory agency are of great significance to improving the level of local safety production governance.In general,this research has verified or falsified some of the existing theoretical hypotheses in the field of production safety,and made up for the theoretical gaps in the field of production safety in theories of promotion incentives and collusion between government and enterprise,and proposed actual safety production governance.Reliable suggestions and improvement ideas are of important theoretical and practical significance.