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Research On Evolutionary Game Of Supply Chain Production And Marketing Decision Under Government Environmental Regulation

Posted on:2024-09-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:F L DuanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2531306929490634Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,as the global industrialization process continues to advance,a large amount of greenhouse gas emissions have led to increasingly prominent climate problems,and the path of low-carbon development has gradually become the common pursuit of the international community.Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the pace of China’s development of low-carbon economy has accelerated,and the low-carbon industry has been continuously optimized and upgraded.However,the establishment and development of low-carbon supply chain,as an important step in the transformation of chain enterprises to low-carbon economy,is still in the early stage.Therefore,it is of great significance to study how government environmental measures promote sellers,manufacturers and consumers to interact with each other through carbon trading market and product market,and to explore how to realize the stable development of low-carbon supply chain under the background of consumers’ low-carbon preference.Firstly,the thesis introduces the relevant background and research significance of supply chain joint emission reduction,and the research on low-carbon supply chain at home and abroad is elaborated from three aspects:development and connotation,research methods,and influencing factors,which pave the way for the development of the following chapters.Then,the two basic theories of evolutionary game theory and carbon emission trading mechanism are introduced in detail,which lays the foundation for the model construction and stability analysis of this paper.Then,based on the background of carbon trading,two evolutionary game models with long-term dynamic characteristics of separation of production and marketing(government,retailers and manufacturers)and self-production and self-marketing(government,enterprises and consumers)are constructed respectively,and the strategic stability of game players is analyzed.Finally,numerical simulation is used to further explore the interaction mechanism between game players and the influencing factors of low-carbon production and marketing mode.The conclusions obtained can provide useful reference for relevant government departments and supply chain production and marketing enterprises to make scientific decisions.The results show that the realization of low-carbon transformation and evolution of enterprises is the result of game interaction among three stakeholders;the willingness of retailers and manufacturers to choose the combination of low-carbon production and marketing strategies increases with the increase of carbon trading price.In the early days of the carbon market,the role of carbon trading policy is limited.The low-carbon subsidies and penalties of the government can guide the production and operation behavior of retailers and manufacturers.In the low-carbon "post-subsidy era",the government’s incentives in both positive and negative directions weakened,and the low carbon production and marketing sensitivity coefficient determined by consumers’ low carbon preference became an important factor to promote the stable development of low carbon supply chain.
Keywords/Search Tags:carbon trading, environmental regulation, low carbon preference, low-carbon supply chain, evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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