| Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China 70 years ago,China has witnessed rapid economic development,continuous improvement of people’s living standards,continuous improvement of the social security system,and gradual improvement of environmental pollution control.All these are inseparable from the role of the national government.However,in recent years,environmental problems have still troubled the government and the public.Environmental problems threaten the health of Chinese residents,hinder the sustainable development of our economy,and also cause negative effects on our international image.According to the 2020 Communique on the State of China’s Ecology and Environment,135 out of 337 cities at prefecture level and above exceeded the standards in 2020,accounting for 41 percent.Although the overall number of good days in cities increased by 5.0 percent compared with 2019,the control of air pollution in China still needs to be strengthened.In 2020,PM2.5,O3,PM10,NO2 and SO2 were the primary pollutants in the total number of days exceeding the standard,accounting for 51.0%.Meanwhile,32 Chinese cities remained on the list in 2020,according to the global air pollution Survey report.At the same time,the central government has begun to increase the assessment and supervision of environmental protection.When environmental protection assessment is included in the performance assessment of officials,many environmental protection policies and pollution control policies have also been introduced.However,in the current administrative system and the personnel system in our country,the region for environmental policy enforcement is not only economic growth,industrial structure,population scale,foreign investment and other economic and social factors,also by the local administration officials term,individual characteristics and the impact of individual behavior decision-making.Based on the top-down political management system and the development of promotion tournament model,the behavior and decision of local officials will be motivated by the economic and political promotion from the central government.Most scholars believe that the tenure and individual characteristics of officials are one of the main factors affecting the promotion incentive of local officials.Then based on the perspective of official promotion incentive,how will the impact of official’s term of office be on the environmental pollution control behavior of local officials in China?What is the transmission mechanism of official tenure to environmental pollution control?This article will carry on the preliminary discussion to these questions.In this paper,panel data and regional environmental pollution data of 281 city officials at prefecture-level and above in China from 2005 to 2019 were collected,among which the official data were the sample data of municipal party secretaries,and the fixed effects model was used to empirically test the panel data.In the data collation and description,we found that the average term of office of municipal Party secretaries from 2005 to 2019 was less than three years,and the turnover of officials was relatively frequent.Based on this,this article embarks from the Angle of promotion incentives,prefecture-level official term of our country and the relationship between environmental pollution and system research,the concrete research official term for local heterogeneity the influence of sulfur dioxide emissions,officials and regional heterogeneity analysis and there may be a threshold effect and mechanism of action,thus,the following conclusions:1.During the term of office of Municipal Party secretary,regional environmental pollution and the term of office of officials show U-shaped changes.The U-shaped turning point appeared in the second year after the official took office,and the U-shaped relationship was no longer significantly correlated in the fifth year after the official took office.In addition,in the subsample regression of official age,older officials have greater promotion incentives than younger officials.2.In terms of the heterogeneity of officials,local officials will increase the probability of collusion between government and enterprises,which is more likely to cause environmental pollution,and officials with a graduate degree or above are relatively more conducive to environmental pollution control.In addition,the change of provincial Party secretary in the same year is not conducive to the performance of municipal Party secretary in environmental pollution control.3.There is a certain spatial heterogeneity and urban heterogeneity between the tenure of Party secretary and environmental pollution.In terms of spatial heterogeneity,the U-shaped relationship is significant in the eastern region,while the U-shaped relationship is relatively absent in the central and western regions.In terms of urban heterogeneity,provincial capital cities have a higher correlation between their official tenure and environmental pollution than non-provincial capital cities,and non-resource cities have a more significant relationship between their official tenure and environmental pollution than resource-based cities.4.Based on the possible assessment indicators of official performance,the panel threshold model is used to find that the differences in marketization degree and technological innovation level in different regions have a certain impact on the mechanism and path of the effect of official tenure on environmental pollution.5.The results of the influence mechanism test show that the investment in fixed assets,the scale of government finance and investment in environmental governance are the possible channels through which officials’ tenure affects environmental pollution.The research of this paper enriches the literature in the field of the influence effect of official tenure,and can provide useful reference for optimizing official governance under the constraints of environmental objectives.Based on this,this paper puts forward the following Suggestions:(1)in perfecting environmental protection incentive mechanism of local officials and environmental constraints mechanism,on the basis of further perfecting the system of official term and the official retirement system,avoid too short term of local officials and change frequently,so as to ensure the continuity of environmental policy implementation,and prevent the officials in the final term of inaction and lazy government behavior;(2)Considering the influence of culture,standardize the relationship between the government and enterprises,and prevent the formation of government-enterprise collusion;With the help of local complex,the informal environmental regulation,the officials can be guided and restrained correctly.(3)Strengthen the diversified construction of cities,improve the single economic structure and employment structure of the single phenomenon;(4)Deepen regional market-oriented reform and strengthen regional technological innovation capability;(5)Avoid excessive investment and local expenditure,and make reasonable use of local investment and expenditure. |
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