| Over the past 40 years of reform and opening up,China's economic development has achieved tremendous achievements.The national economy has advanced significantly,and the economic aggregate has reached a new level,achieving a historic leap.In 2017,if calculated at constant prices,China 's GDP increased by 33.5 times the GDP of 1978,with an average annual growth rate of 9.5%,equivalent to doubling every 8 years,compared to the 2.9% growth rate of the world economy over the same period As a matter of fact,our country has ranked among the top economies in the world.The rapid economic development is inseparable from China's unique official management system.The promotion of positions and powers encourages local officials to develop in accordance with the central directive.However,at the same time of rapid economic development,our environmental situation is not optimistic.After the environmental pollution broke through the environmental carrying capacity,the country has paid more and more attention to environmental protection and governance.Objective data also shows that our governance is quite effective.Therefore,more and more scholars began to analyze the effectiveness of environmental governance in China from the perspective of promotion and promotion of officials.In particular,under the official evaluation system in which political incentives have gradually shifted from GDP as the mainstay to economics and the environment,local officials have begun to pay attention to the environmental governance of their jurisdictions in order to adapt to the changes in incentives.So,what impact do changes in promotion incentives during the replacement period and during the term of office have on environmental governance? Will prefecture-level mayors and municipal party committee secretaries produce different results due to different job content? These questions will be answered in this article.This paper selects the city data and official data of 277 prefecture-level cities nationwide from 2007 to 2017,among which official data includes sample data of the mayor and the secretary of the municipal party committee,and uses a fixed-effect model to empirically test this panel data.In sorting and describing the data,we found that from 2007 to 2017,both the mayor and the secretary of the municipal party committee had an average term of less than three years,and officials changed more frequently.Compared with the mayor,the position of the secretary of the municipal party committee was more For stability.This article empirically examines the relationship between the term,replacement and personal heterogeneity of the mayor and the secretary of the municipal party committee and environmental governance.The main conclusions drawn are as follows: when the mayor officials are replaced,the environmental governance measured by the industrial smoke reduction rate will be weakened.During the term of mayor official,environmental governance and term of office present an inverted U-shaped change.The age of the mayor and the source of reassignment will have a certain impact on environmental governance.Older and non-city mayors may be more likely to ignore environmental governance.The replacement of the secretary of the municipal party committee had no obvious impact on the environmental governance measured by the industrial smoke emission reduction rate.During the tenure of the municipal party secretary,the environmental governance and the term of office showed an inverted U-shaped change.The education level of the municipal party secretary has a certain effect on environmental governance.The influence of high education level puts more emphasis on environmental governance.This article highlights the influence of local officials' tenure from many factors affecting environmental governance,shows that local policy makers have a significant influence on the regional environment,and provides a new analytical perspective for solving environmental pollution problems and improving local environmental governance. |
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