| The human economic society facing the most biggest environmental problems is warming in the twentieth century’s,China plays a vital role as a carbon superpower in global climate governance.In 2020,Xi Jinping put forward the dual-carbon goal at the United Nations General Assembly.The carbon-neutral strategy means that the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by human society is equal to the amount of carbon sink and the amount absorbed by CCUS(carbon capture,utilization and storage).To achieve "carbon neutral",not just rely on energy conservation and emissions reduction technology,but also add negative carbon technology.Carbon trading is one of the important path of carbon neutral,carbon sequestration of carbon offset by environmental organizations listed as one of the most effective negative carbon plan.The demand for carbon neutrality of enterprises is to achieve net zero carbon emissions.The carbon emission reduction market and carbon sink market will form a new "double reduction" platform to jointly achieve the goal of net zero carbon emissions in the supply chain.Government subsidies to zero-carbon supply chain enterprises have significant external effects,and will further promote enterprises to carry out low-carbon production and carbon sink investment.Based on the above background,from the perspective of manufacturers’ lowcarbon technology emission reduction and retailers’ carbon sink investment emission reduction in the zero-carbon supply chain,this paper constructs a three-stage Stackelberg game method study involving government decision-makers: the impact of government zero-carbon subsidy coefficient on manufacturers’ efforts to reduce emissions and retailers’ carbon sink investment in the zero-carbon supply chain and the profit of each decision-making body.By comparing and analyzing the difference of the impact of the non-government subsidy strategy,the government subsidy manufacturer strategy and the government subsidy retailer strategy on the decision,and further considering the impact of the coordination contract strategy on the optimal decision.The results showed :(1)Under the strategy of government subsidizing manufacturers’ technological innovation to emission reduction or government subsidizing retailers’ carbon sink investment to emission reduction,manufacturers and retailers’ carbon neutralization efforts and corresponding profits in the supply chain have increased,while social welfare has also increased.(2)Under the retailer’s investment subsidy strategy for carbon sink trading,the overall profit of the supply chain reaches the maximum,but the profit of the supply chain increases first and then decreases,so the overall profit of the supply chain reaches the optimum within a certain threshold.At the same time,the social welfare under the retailer subsidy strategy reaches the maximum,and the social welfare increases first and then decreases with the increase of the government subsidy coefficient,so there is a maximum,that is,the optimal subsidy coefficient exists.In addition,this paper designs a carbon reduction cost sharing contract for retailers,which proves that the contract can achieve carbon neutral supply chain coordination,further optimize the optimal decision value of all members of the zero-carbon supply chain,and improve the economic benefits of the entire secondary supply chain.Through theoretical and numerical analysis,further explained the government subsidy coefficient θ,it has a significant impact on the carbon emission reduction,overall profit and social welfare of the supply chain.The above conclusions provide theoretical support for the government to formulate reasonable subsidy strategies and enterprises to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. |