Strategy Of Supply Chain Members Considering Different Power Structures Under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

With the increasingly serious international climate problem,China has clearly put forward the development goal of "double carbon" in 2020.That is to achieve carbon peak by 2030 and carbon neutralization by 2060.Therefore,the Chinese government has actively implemented emission reduction policies.Industries with large carbon emissions such as power generation and steel have responded one after another.However,how to achieve a significant decline in greenhouse gas emissions while making steady economic development has become an urgent problem to be solved.In this context,this paper takes the low-carbon supply chain as the research object.For different supply chain power structures,this paper uses the differential game method to investigate the game situations of different power structures among supply chain members.It mainly includes the centralized decision-making of supply chain members,the Stackelberg game and the Nash equilibrium game under the decentralized decision-making of supply chain members.Aiming at the current carbon emission reduction policy in China,this paper considers the carbon emission links of manufacturers and retailers,and uses the Cap-and-Trade regulation to calculate the emission reduction cost of enterprises.In view of the fact that carbon emission reduction is a long-term problem,this paper describes the carbon emission reduction and low-carbon goodwill level as a dynamic equation changing with time by using differential equations,and makes a dynamic study on the carbon emission reduction problem.Through the solution and analysis of the model and MATLAB numerical examples,this paper mainly draws the following conclusions:(1)carbon trading price plays different roles in different emission reduction modes of supply chains.The government should set different carbon trading price change mechanisms according to different modes of supply chains,so as to regulate the speed of enterprise economic development and the growth rate of carbon emissions.(2)The level of carbon emission reduction and low-carbon goodwill will have a specific change trend in a specific period of time,and each member enterprise of the supply chain will choose such business strategies as skimming pricing or penetration pricing according to this trend;With the passage of time,the level of carbon emission reduction and low-carbon goodwill will converge to the corresponding steady state,and this steady state level will be affected by consumer market factors,carbon emission reduction policies and so on.(3)Each member enterprise of the supply chain will tend to different power structures according to different emission reduction modes,so as to maximize the total profit.However,when the supply chain members make centralized decisions,although they can obtain higher comprehensive income than when they make decentralized decisions,they are more vulnerable to the impact of changes in adverse factors.This paper enriches the research on the game between low-carbon supply chain members under the carbon emission reduction policy of differential game.The research conclusion has a certain reference value for low-carbon supply chain members to make scientific business decisions and the government to implement more scientific carbon emission reduction policies under various game situations.