Research On Greenwashing Behavior Of Green Finance Based On Evolutionary Game Theory And Countermeasures

Developing the green financial market as an important investment and financing platform for China’s green industry is an important measure to build a resource saving society in China.Enterprises participating in ecological environmental protection and governance projects through the green financial market is one of the important ways to achieve sustainable development in China and accelerate the process of green transformation of China’s industry.In recent years,China has vigorously developed green finance,and the development of green bonds has become a booster for enterprises to participate in green projects,broadening their investment and financing channels.However,due to the late start of the green financial market in China,the regulatory system is still incomplete,there are still issues such as incomplete information disclosure systems,inconsistent and unclear green standards,and there are a large number of phenomena of " green-washing " in the green financial market.The emergence of a large number of enterprises’ green-washing behavior will trigger the effect of bad currency driving out good currency,ultimately leading to the ineffectiveness of the green financial market,thereby hindering the healthy development of China’s green financial market.Therefore,studying how to prevent enterprises from green-ashing behavior will promote the high-quality development of China’s green financial market,thereby realizing the green transformation of China’s macro economy,identifying emerging growth points in the green economy,and improving the ecological environment while further improving the quality of China’s economic development.Based on evolutionary game theory,this study examines the game between governments and enterprises in the green financial market,constructs a two-party evolutionary game model for the regulation of green-washing behavior in green financial market,depicts the theoretical path of their evolutionary game decisionmaking process using phase diagrams,and conducts numerical simulation experiments using matlab software.Finally,through a case study,the game process between the governments and enterprises in the green financial market is analyzed in a real environmental governance project scenario of green bond issuance and investment.Firstly,this article expounds the origin of green finance,respectively sorts out the relationship between ecological environment and macroeconomic and green finance,and clarifies that green finance is an important force for achieving China’s sustainable development goals and ensuring the stable operation of macroeconomic.And from the definition,motivation,and consequences of general enterprises green-washing behavior to the motivation,and impacting consequences of green-washing behavior in the green financial market,summarizing the main reasons that affect the current greenwashing behavior of enterprises in the green financial market,laying a foundation for the later analysis of the decision-making motivation of game players.Secondly,this paper is based on the theoretical foundations of information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theory,and other theories,and proposes a problem description and relevant assumptions according to the actual situation,constructs a two-party evolutionary game model for the supervision of green-washing behavior in green financial market,and tests the model solution and stability of the equilibrium point.The model solution results and matlab numerical simulation experiments indicate that there may be three stable equilibrium points in the system,representing the three stages of the green financial market: the start-up stage,the growth stage,and the mature stage.Finally,in the theoretical analysis section,the impact of parameter changes on the system convergence point is clarified.Then,through investigating a real case of Hegang Group issuing green bonds for environmental governance,based on the real data of the case and unified quantification,and using a two-party evolutionary game model to conduct numerical simulation experiments,combined with phase diagrams and the true meaning of parameters,analyzing the changes in the system convergence direction of the government and enterprise under the condition of parameter changes,and identifies important parameters that affect the decision-making of the government and enterprise.Finally,this study proposes policy recommendations such as strengthening market regulation,improving the external pressure on enterprises to implement green behavior,strengthening the mandatory,normative,and accurate disclosure of enterprise information,thereby reducing the degree of information opacity in the green financial market,and constructing a unified green evaluation standard system.