| With the emergence of a new generation of information technology,Internet-based intelligent infrastructure is in urgent need of development.With the platform model and sharing economy gaining popularity,the management mode of traditional PPP project to construction and operation infrastructure can hardly adapt to the highly intelligent and platform-based public service requirements,so the development of platform model for intelligent PPP project is an inevitable choice to innovate infrastructure business model and enhance social welfare.How to meet the demands of various stakeholders through reasonable pricing of platform services and government subsidy mechanism,and dissolve the contradiction between the profit-seeking nature of social capital and the public welfare of infrastructure is the key factor to ensure the sustainable development of platform model for intelligent PPP project.In the context of irreversible and deepening population aging,it is a strategic need to implement the platform model for intelligent PPP in the field of senior care services to meet the massive demand for senior care services.Therefore,based on the Stackelberg game model,optimal control theory and computational experiments,this paper systematically researches the service pricing and government subsidy mechanism of the smart elderly home care service platform under the PPP model.The main research contents of this paper are as follows.Firstly,a model of platform pricing and government subsidies under the PPP model where the market of smart elderly home care services is in a monopoly state is studied.Based on the Stackelberg game model,a master-slave game model with the PPP project layer consisting of the government and the platform(social capitalist)as the dominant player and the platform layer consisting of the platform,the elderly and the elderly service provider as the follower is constructed,and the optimal platform pricing based on maximizing the platform profit and the optimal government subsidy based on maximizing social welfare are obtained.It is found that the platform pricing is decreasing as the amount of government subsidy increases.Secondly,the platform pricing and government subsidy model under the PPP model where the smart elderly home care service market is in a state of double oligopoly competition is studied.Optimal control theory is used to construct the equation for the state change of excess/shortage of service supply capacity based on service supply and demand,and to control the state reduction of accumulated excess/shortage orders to zero in the process of dynamic optimization of the control variable(service price)to maximize the expected revenue of the platform.The optimal dynamic competitive price for each of platform 4)and platform 5)in the case of platform competition during the peak and low demand periods is solved using the Pontryagin maximum principle,and the optimal government subsidy amount over time is solved based on the dynamic competitive price.Thirdly,using the method of computational experiment,based on the bottom-up analysis idea,we deconstructed the complex system of the smart elderly home care service platform under the PPP model,obtained the PPP project subsystem,the elderly demand subsystem,and the service supply subsystem,and studied the logic and rules of the decision-making behavior of the elderly Agent and the elderly service provider Agent in the monopolistic and competitive platforms,respectively.Using the matching degree of supply and demand,platform profit and social welfare as the characterization of the platform operation effect,the computational experimental platform of the smart elderly home care service platform system under the PPP model in the monopolistic and competitive situations are constructed respectively.Finally,based on the constructed computational experimental platform and determining the parameters involved in it,the simulation results of the smart elderly home care service platform under the PPP model with different platform commission rates when the supply of elderly service providers varies in the monopolistic platform,and the simulation results of the smart elderly home care service platform under the PPP model with different platform competition levels when the demand peaks and troughs in the competitive platform.Based on the analysis of the simulation results and the theoretical derivation of platform pricing and government subsidies,the implications of this study on platform pricing and government subsidies are proposed. |
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