Financing Game And Empirical Analysis Of Foreign Trade-oriented Small And Medium-sized Enterprises In China

The difficulty of credit financing of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises has always plagued China’s economic development.In recent years,China has formulated a series of policies to promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises,but we have to admit that there is still a conflict between a large number of idle social funds and a large number of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises’ demands can not get external funds.China;s small and medium-sized enterprises generally have a series of problems such as small scale and insufficient investment capital,which makes financial institutions prefer to provide financial support for large enterprises and refuse to provide loans to foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises.This restricts the development of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises.It has become an indisputable fact that the financing dilemma of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises hinders the orderly operation of China’s economy.Therefore,at present,solving the financing dilemma of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises has become an urgent practical problem to be solved.This paper solves the financing difficulties of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises,we must find the real reasons for the financing difficulties of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises.In view of this,on the basis of summarizing and summarizing the existing research results,this paper focuses on the analysis of the characteristics and facts of the financing of China’s foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises,especially the verification of the financing difficulties faced by foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises through empirical evidence.On this basis,combined with the evolutionary game theory and its related properties,this paper attempts to analyze the game between foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises and banks,as well as foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises Based on the tripartite evolutionary game analysis of banks and governments,this paper finds out the root of the financing problem of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises.The research shows that:(1)financing constraints are indeed not conducive to the international trade development of foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises,and foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises are indeed faced with financing difficulties;(2)It is difficult to ensure the continuity of the game between banks and enterprises by relying on market forces alone.We should consider both market forces and forces outside the market in order to ensure the interests of any party involved in the game;(3)Government policy guidance plays a vital role in alleviating or solving the financing difficulties of foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises.The stability decision-making choice of the government,banks and foreign trade small and medium-sized enterprises is closely related to the benefits created by financing,payment costs and government policy guidance.(4)The empirical results show that government policy guidance does play a vital role in alleviating the financing difficulties of foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises.The joint action of government policy guidance and financial support helps to alleviate the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises,and there are obvious regional differences in this impact.The financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises in the eastern and central regions have been significantly improved,but not in the western region.Therefore,combined with the research conclusions,this paper constructs a multi-channel financing system for China’s foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises to alleviate the financing difficulties of China’s foreign trade-oriented small and medium-sized enterprises.