Research On R&d Crowdsourcing Decision Of Manufacturing Enterprises Based On Stackelberg Game

This paper integrates the two parallel fields of crowdsourcing and supply chain.The crowdsourcing supply chain of manufacturing enterprises is introduced from the crowdsourcing supply chain case of Haier Group to make up for the lack of existing literature research.The Stackelberg game model of crowdsourcing supply chain of manufacturing enterprises composed of one manufacturer and one contractor is constructed to clarify the difference between crowdsourcing supply chain game and traditional supply chain game and study the optimal equilibrium solution and profit problem under three incentive mechanisms.The results show that the cost impact coefficient of the outsourcing party is a key parameter affecting the decision-making of the crowdsourcing supply chain.Therefore,before adopting the crowdsourcing supply chain model,enterprises should select the outsourcing party with rich crowdsourcing experience or high ability level to participate in the crowdsourcing activities.When the cost impact coefficient of the contractor or the consumer product innovation preference coefficient is different,RS mode is not always the optimal crowdsourcing supply chain mode compared with CS mode and UI mode.Both CS mode and RS mode have thresholds for decision parameters.When the threshold is reached,CS mode and RS mode can adjust the optimal decision and maximum profit,but when the decision parameters exceed a specific threshold,the proportion of cost sharing and profit sharing will decrease,and the maximum profit will also decrease.There is "hedging effect" in RS mode,that is,the increase of revenue sharing proportion will not improve the innovation degree of product r&d or the effort level of the contractor,but the increase within the threshold range will improve the overall profit of the contractor or the crowdsourcing supply chain,but the profit of the contractor will decrease,so the contractor is more willing to implement RS mode.The cost sharing ratio and revenue sharing ratio in CS mode and RS mode are not only affected by the cost impact coefficient of the recipient,but also affected by the consumer product innovation preference coefficient and other parameters,and there are thresholds in both of them.When the values are different,the optimal equilibrium solution and maximum profit value are different.