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Incentive Research On Information Sharing Of Mixed Supply Chain Based On Stackellberg Game

Posted on:2021-09-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B B ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2480306293472914Subject:Industrial Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Nowadays the traditional supply chain management pattern already cannot satisfy the new dynamic market demand,improve the focus should shift to the overall information flow,logistics and cash flow,and information sharing can make the whole supply chain is to strengthen the core competitiveness,the domestic and foreign scholars in the research mostly from the perspective of a single research information sharing technical or incentives,such as the lack of systematic research.In order to study the value,implementation resistance and effective incentive mechanism of information sharing in maximizing the overall and individual benefits of the supply chain,this paper innovates on the basis of relevant theories and literature review.Aiming at the phenomenon of information asymmetry in the supply chain,a hybrid supply chain composed of two suppliers and one retailer is constructed,in which one supplier participates in information sharing and the other does not.Firstly,the benefits of information sharing between two suppliers and retailers were compared to analyze the value of information sharing.Then the impediments to information sharing due to objective reasons are introduced,and the specific solutions are proposed based on the model.Through these proofs,in any case,information sharing can maximize the benefits of the whole supply chain and individuals through incentives or contracts.That is,suppliers,retailers and supply chains all gain more benefits from information sharing than when information is not Shared.It also effectively improves the awareness of information sharing and participation in the supply chain,making it more balanced in benefits and more competitive in the market.Then,the incentive mechanism of information sharing is studied according to different suppliers' participation,and the price protection strategy is put forward to give up the profit to the suppliers who are willing to participate in the information sharing,so as to encourage another supplier.The model is modified to ensure that the wholesale price of participating suppliers must not be lower than that of non-participating suppliers.It is proved that under the price protection strategy,both suppliers and retailers participating in information sharing can gain more profits,and this strategy can effectively motivate suppliers to participate in information sharing.Finally,it was implemented in specific cases.Taking the supply chain of Y supermarket and two local strawberry fields as an example,the actual data was brought into the supply chain to prove the benefits of information sharing for the whole supply chain,and how to adjust the benefits to stimulate the information sharing behavior in the case of non-win-win situation.It also proves that the price protection strategy can motivate both parties to participate in the information sharing.The conclusion is combined with the practice to make the model and conclusion practical.Through the establishment of the model and case analysis,it can be concluded that both suppliers and retailers participating in information sharing can gain revenue increase;The resistance to information sharing can be overcome by using pricing when information is not Shared.Price protection strategy is a good incentive for suppliers to participate in information sharing.
Keywords/Search Tags:supply chain management, Information sharing, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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