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Research On Mobile Platform Members Decision And Contract Selection Based On Stackelberg Game

Posted on:2023-08-23Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J X ShiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2530307103458664Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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A new business operation model has emerged with the rapid development of the Internet,and this new model is the mobile platform system.It is well known that mobile platform systems carry a large number of applications that can be run,such as the two application system giants:Apple’s i OS system and its application store,and Google’s Android system and its application store.The popularity of mobile platform systems has accumulated a large number of app users,which has attracted the attention of traditional advertisers,which has given rise to in-app advertising.Mobile platforms have also changed from a traditional market structure with only app users to a bilateral market structure with both app users and advertisers,providing an interactive platform for app users and advertisers.And to open the advertising channel in the app,both the platform owner and the app developer have the decision-making power,which is the split structure of the mobile platform.Then the supply chain contract choice between the mobile platform members —— app developer and platform owner are crucial,and the pricing of the app,whether the ad channel should be opened,and the pricing of the ads after the ad channel is opened become the decisions to be made by the mobile platform members.First,this paper makes the app developer and platform owner adopt revenue sharing contracts in the advertiser side of the market,and studies the equilibrium decision under the adoption of wholesale contracts and revenue sharing contracts by the app developer and platform owner,respectively,in the app user side.This equilibrium decision includes the pricing decision of the app,the decision of whether to publish ads within the app,and the price and revenue sharing ratio decisions of the ads.Secondly,we explore the contract selection problem of app developers and platform owners under the equilibrium decision and analyze how the decision variables differ under the wholesale and revenue sharing contracts.Finally,this paper introduces competition among app developers and the existence of four advertising decisions in the presence of a duopoly competition,studies the equilibrium pricing of apps and the equilibrium profit in the presence of competition,and analyzes the equilibrium profit of two app developers to investigate the factors affecting the profit.This paper constructs the Stackelberg game model with the platform owner as the leader and the application developer as the follower,and uses the reverse induction method to solve and analyze the model,and the main conclusions are as follows: 1)under two contracts,the advertising decision of the platform owner mainly depends on the advertiser’s valuation of the advertisement,while the advertising decision of the application developer mainly depends on the advertising price set by the platform owner and the advertising revenue sharing ratio;2)whether to open the advertising channel has no effect on the application developer’s tendency to choose the contract,but affects the platform owner’s choice;3)considering the case of application developer competition,equilibrium pricing of applications exists under all four advertising decisions,and the degree of market competition and the application sales revenue sharing ratio have a greater impact on the profits of application developers.
Keywords/Search Tags:Mobile platforms, In-app advertising, Supply chain contracts, Two-sided markets, Stackelberg game
PDF Full Text Request
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