A Study On The Impact Of EPC Project Management Performance Under Opportunistic Behavior

The "double cycle" background and the novel coronavirus pneumonia epidemic have brought huge challenges to China's construction industry.The high-quality development needs of the industry have made the EPC project general contracting model of integrated management a general trend.With the release of official documents by the central and local governments,EPC project general contracting has become the preferred construction mode recommended by various national ministries and commissions in large-scale projects.While making certain progress,it is impossible to avoid the reality that its implementation is not ideal.The rationalization of EPC projects and the acceleration of the general contracting model represented by EPC have become the top priority of China's "construction industry reform".From the perspective of defensive EPC general contractor's opportunistic behavior,the thesis comprehensively uses literature review,theoretical analysis,model construction and evolutionary game research methods to clarify the two related paths of relational governance to EPC project management performance.Behavioral strategy is analyzed by evolutionary game,which clarifies the governance countermeasures of EPC projects.Firstly,it summarizes the development status of EPC projects in China.This thesis analyzes the promotion of EPC project general contracting mode under the background of post epidemic era and high-quality development of construction industry,analyzes the problems existing in the current development status of EPC,and expounds the necessity of relational governance of EPC project from the perspective of defending general contractor's opportunistic behavior.Secondly,it combs the relevant theories of opportunism and relational governance.From the transaction cost theory,principal-agent theory and relational exchange theory,this thesis puts forward the defense mechanism of opportunistic behavior,makes a theoretical analysis of project relational governance,and then leads to the feasibility and advantages of relational governance in defense of opportunistic behavior.Combined with the characteristics of EPC project,this thesis analyzes the explicit opportunistic behavior of EPC contractor in violation of formal contract and the implicit opportunistic behavior in violation of relational contract,and specifically expounds the influence of the implementation of relational governance in EPC project.Thirdly,it constructs the research hypothesis and theoretical model of relational governance on EPC project management performance from the perspective of opportunism.312 valid questionnaires are used for confirmatory analysis.Based on literature research,theoretical analysis and characteristics of EPC project,this thesis constructs research hypotheses among relational governance,opportunism,cooperation and project management performance,and establishes structural equation theoretical model.Through questionnaire surveys and field investigations,this thesis collects questionnaire data and EPC project information from the four provinces of Shandong,Shanxi,Shaanxi,and Zhejiang,uses SPSS and AMOS software to analyze the data and verify hypotheses and models.The research concluded that there are two related paths under the EPC model: "relational governance ?implicit opportunism ? cooperation ? project management performance" and "relational governance ? implicit opportunism ? explicit opportunism ? cooperation ? project management performance".Analyze the main causes of the research results based on the characteristics of the project.Finally,using the evolutionary game theory to construct the replication dynamic equation,this thesis analyzes the stability strategy between the owner's implementation of relational governance and the general contractor's opportunistic behavior.Therefore,combined with the post epidemic era and high-quality development background,this thesis puts forward the governance countermeasures from the two aspects of the owner and the general contractor,that is,joint action and the establishment of a long-term credit system for EPC project to encourage the owner to implement relational governance;prediction of opportunism in the contract system to prevent the occurrence of opportunism of the general contractor.Based on the existing literature,this thesis makes up for the theoretical defects of EPC project relational governance to a certain extent,and combs the relevant theoretical research of EPC project relational governance from the perspective of opportunism;based on the practical defense of general contractor opportunism and improvement of EPC project management performance,the research results and suggestions provide strategic reference for the future development of EPC project and policy formulation,and have engineering application value.In the future,with the fundamental change of project implementation mode,the reform of EPC will gradually deepen,thereby promoting the high-quality development of the construction industry.