Research On River Basin Water Pollution Control And Ecological Compensation Based On Game Theory

Water pollution control and watershed ecological compensation is a frontier hot issue in the field of scientific research and environmental engineering.Its efficient numerical simulation research and ecological compensation strategy analysis have important theoretical value and application prospects.Based on the current status of watershed pollution control,this paper constructs a differential game model for cross-border pollution control based on emission rights trading and reputational factors under multiple game scenarios,and constructs a model based on the final stable equilibrium analysis of the optimal strategy.Based on the evolutionary game model of watershed ecological compensation supporting decision-making theory,the optimal control strategy and the stability of the optimal strategy of the players in various regions were explored.Chapters 1 and 2 gives the basic background and literature review required for the dissertation.The Chapter 3 uses differential game theory and optimal control theory to study the continuous time-based transboundary water pollution control problem.Differential game theory,etc.to build a differential game model for transboundary water pollution control in the basin,to calculate the optimal pollution discharge level and the optimal number of pollution rights transactions;use the HJB equation to solve the optimal path,and combine the relevant parameter analysis to obtain the most cooperative situation.The optimal emission level is lower than that of the non-cooperative situation,and the number of emission rights transactions in the cooperative situation is higher than that of the non-cooperative situation.The Chapter 4 builds a differential game model of cross-border pollution based on reputational factors,and uses the optimal control theory to compare and analyze the optimal pollutant emissions,optimal emissions,and optimal emissions of the two regions under the three conditions of non-cooperation,cooperation,and two-way compensation.Change paths of variables such as pollution control intensity and optimal compensation intensity,as well as the overall level of social welfare throughout the plan period.The study found that the optimal pollution emission level is the lowest in the case of two-way compensation,and the pollution control intensity is the highest in the case of cooperation.The Chapter 5 analyzes the final stable equilibrium strategy of each region(government)in the face of various watershed problems through evolutionary game theory.Water pollution hazards and their main causes.The three decision-making theories are applied to the watershed pollution control,and the influence of different indicators such as ecological benefit,reputational marginal benefit and loss,opportunity cost,direct cost and ecological compensation fee on the final steady state of the optimal strategy in each region of the watershed is analyzed.The Chapter 6 summarizes the previous research in detail,at the same time,it explains the limitations of the research content of this paper and looks forward to the future work.