Dynamic Optimal Strategies In Transboundary Pollution Game Under Learning By Doing

The first part of the article constructs a transboundary pollution differential game model,in which emission permits trading and pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are considered.After that,the optimal control theory is used to study the model between the two players in the symmetric region.The optimal emission path and the optimal emission reduction strategy are calculated by using the Runge-Kutta method with 4 order precision,and the numerical results are given to the parameters involved in the objective function.In the second part,we establish a differential game of transboundary pollution in asymmetric region,and add the influence of carbon tax on the player on the basis of the model one.In addition,the model still carries out differential game between the players,and the local government and enterprises play the Stackelberg game,that is,the government controls the enterprise as a leader through the formulation of carbon tax.The local enterprise regulates the production level according to the carbon tax made by the government to maximizes the profit of the manufacturers.Then,the Pontryagin's maximum principle is used to solve the objective function,we will get the carbon tax price and the optimal emission reduction level corresponding to the optimality of the game player's rights and interests,and then the parameters involved in the function are assigned bu using MATLAB.Finally,it is concluded that both in the study of transboundary pollution in symmetric regions or in the study of transboundary pollution in asymmetric regions,the effect of learning by doing can improve the level of abatement and emission of platers,The level of pollution stock in the air is declined.Moreover,cooperation plays an important role in boosting economy and controlling pollution as well.