The Research On Operational Organization Optimization For Urban Rail Transit Investment Projects Based On The Theory Of Evolutionary Game Dynamics

This article researches into the operational organization optimization strategy for players in an evolutionary game,by taking Taiyuan Metro Line 2 PPP project as an example.Considering that Taiyuan Public Transport Holdings(Group)Co.,Ltd.(the bus company for short)and Taiyuan China Railway Rail Transit Construction and Operation Co.,Ltd,(the metro company for short)were deciding how to optimize their operational organization after the opening of Taiyuan Metro Line 2,a game model is constructed for the above two parties based on the competition and cooperation relationship between them.The actual operation data is used to calculate the parameters to solve the Nash equilibria in the real game,which means that the rationality of the model is verified.The evolutionary game model is used to analyze factors,such as the increase in public transportation passenger flow caused by the adoption of cooperative measures,their respective passenger flow growth coefficients,per capita passenger transportation revenue,the penalty factor for the increase in passenger flow,the total cost of the measures,and the cost allocation ratio,for the influence of the choice of cooperation strategy between the two parties.Research shows that the initial willingness to cooperate has an important impact on the evolution path.As long as the two parties have a slight willingness to cooperate,after a long enough evolution,the two parties will eventually adopt a cooperative strategy,that is,the bus company and the metro company should not give up the possibility of cooperation-Additionally,the reduction penalty factor has a more significant impact on the bus company than the metro company,that is,if the cooperation strategy adopted by the metro company significantly increases the passenger flow of the bus company,it will encourage the bus company to participate in cooperation,and then two parties will eventually adopt a cooperative strategy.Furthermore,the cost of measures has a greater impact on both parties,especially when the cost of measures is higher than the acceptable threshold for both parties,the willingness of both parties to cooperate will be reduced,and eventually both parties will adopt non-cooperative strategies.Based on the characteristics of PPP investment projects,the article discusses the ways and methods of cooperation between urban rail transit operators with social capital as the main body and urban bus operators with local government as the main body.And it innovatively researches the possibility of spontaneous cooperation in the scenario of providing public transportation services and operational organization optimization for different stakeholders,which proposes a method to determine the cost allocation ratio of the measures of both parties using an infinitely repeated bargaining model,and recommends that the value of the discount rate be determined with reference to the financing costs of all parties.