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Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Cooperation Willingness Of Rural Road PPP Financing Model

Posted on:2023-10-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:D H YuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2532306608989319Subject:Agricultural management
Abstract/Summary:
Implementing the rural revitalization strategy is an inevitable requirement for solving the major social contradiction in the new era.With the implementation of the rural revitalization strategy,the economic development in rural areas has been accelerated,and the status of rural roads in the development has been gradually enhanced,and the demand has become increasingly strong.However,due to the unsatisfactory financial revenue and economic development of some local governments,the funds that can be invested in infrastructure construction are relatively scarce,which intensifies the contradiction between economic development in rural areas and rural road construction.As a financing model,PPP model can effectively alleviate the contradiction,but due to the different starting points of PPP project participants,there are generally problems such as long project negotiation time and high negotiation cost.In view of this,this paper first sorted out and analyzed the literature on rural road construction and PPP investment and financing mode,and found that the existing research has limitations,lack of universality and narrow research subjects.Then combined with the prospect theory and evolutionary game theory,the research subject of rural road PPP mode cooperation intention is clarified,that is,the local government of rural road construction and the social capital side of cooperation with it.On this basis,the evolutionary game model of both sides of the game is constructed,and the corresponding variables are set for the strategic choice of both sides.By solving the evolutionary game matrix,the replicative dynamic equations of both sides are obtained,and the stability is judged by using the determinant condition and trace condition of Jacobian matrix,so as to determine the mathematical expression of game equilibrium point of both sides.Finally,MATLAB2019 b software is used to simulate the duplicate dynamic equations of the game.Studies show that: the government party policy decision-making cost and social capital investment costs will pose the influence of different level to the strategy choice,the two sides is the nature of the government’s behavior selection strategy of social capital can be expected return and yield value perception of the project,so that the social capital in the project cooperation can actively participate in and play a positive role;On the contrary,due to the participation of social capital,the government reduces its own value perception of the potential risks of project construction,so that the government’s perception of expected benefits of PPP projects and the actual social benefits tend to be consistent.Therefore,the government should shorten the negotiation time when implementing the decision,escort the construction project during the implementation of the project,and guide the smooth progress of the project.Before making a decision,the enterprise should make a complete plan for the project to gain the trust of the government.During the construction period,it should strictly control the construction quality,adjust measures to local conditions,and make reasonable use of local resources to improve the operating income of the project.This study calculates the best game choice path for both sides,and puts forward targeted suggestions for project negotiation,construction and operation,in order to reduce game rounds,improve project construction efficiency,and comprehensively improve the economic and social benefits of rural road projects.
Keywords/Search Tags:rural roads, evolutionary game, prospect theory, willingness to cooperate, public-private partnership
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