Study On The Control Arrangement And Performance Of The Mixed Ownership Reform Of GREE

State-owned enterprises,as an important support of the national economy,guide the development of the national economy.However,state-owned enterprises have long been under state control,with prominent problems such as imbalance of equity and rigidity of mechanisms.Therefore,mixed ownership reform is imperative.The key to the mixed ownership reform of SOEs is to introduce non-state capital to form a diversified shareholding and improve the modern corporate governance system,so as to optimize the resource allocation efficiency of SOEs,enhance their core competitiveness,and thus promote the high-quality development of China’s economy.However,SOEs face the problem of how to arrange the control rights in the process of mixed ownership reform.As the core part of the mixed ownership reform process,the arrangement of the control of SOEs is the key to the success of the mixed ownership reform,and affects the governance and operation of SOEs after the mixed ownership reform,so it can be said that this core issue touches the hearts of all parties in the mixed ownership reform.This paper takes the case of GREE’s mixed ownership reform as the research object,and studies the arrangement of control of SOEs’ mixed ownership reform by analyzing the check and balance structure of GREE’s mixed ownership reform without actual controller,and then provides experience for SOEs’ mixed ownership reform.Firstly,this paper analyzes the reasons,the plan and the path of GREE’s mixed ownership reform,and explores the questions of why and with whom the mixed ownership reform is carried out.Secondly,through an indepth analysis of the shareholding structure,board of directors and management governance,we explore the questions of whether the control of GREE is transferred and how the control arrangement is carried out.Then,we analyze the performance of the mixed ownership reform in the context of cross-sectional comparison with the same industry,dialectically look at the effect of the mixed ownership reform,and further explore the question of how the interests of all parties are unified in the mixed ownership reform.Finally,we propose case insights and suggestions,and then conclude the paper.Through the analysis of the control arrangement and performance of GREE’s mixed ownership reform,this paper concludes that GREE has boldly innovated the plan of the mixed ownership reform and the management has deeply participated in the mixed ownership reform through the entity operation,which finally formed a control structure with mutual checks and balances and ensured the unification of the interests of all parties in the mixed ownership reform,and GREE has entered the era of no actual controller.