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Research On Construction Safety Production And Supervision Based On Evolutionary Game

Posted on:2022-09-15Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y Y ZhuangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2491306737494554Subject:Master of Engineering (Architectural and Civil Engineering)
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Construction industry is a pillar industry of China’s economy.It is closely related to people’s life and makes great contributions to the development of the national economy.However,the problem of construction safety has also brought great losses to the property safety of the state and the people.In recent years,the state has paid more and more attention to the safety management in the field of construction,the relevant laws and regulations are constantly improving,and the main responsibility of construction safety is gradually clarified,but safety accidents in the field of construction are still frequent.Based on this,by investigating the current situation of safety production and supervision of construction units,combined with the laws and regulations related to construction safety,it is found that the punishment of safety accidents in the existing laws and regulations under the existing legal framework focuses on the occurrence of safety accidents,and does not highlight the investment in safety production.Based on the evolutionary game theory,the three-party evolutionary game model of construction unit,supervision unit and government safety supervision department is established,and the evolutionary stability strategy of safety production and supervision and the local stability point of system equilibrium are solved.Based on the above analysis and findings,the key factors affecting the evolution results,including safety input cost,simple violation but no safety accident,and the fine imposed by the government after the safety accident,are evaluated and simulated,the specific significance of the parameters is discussed,and its impact on the evolution system is verified.The results show that reducing the safety investment cost can effectively promote the three parties to adopt positive strategies,improve the punishment for simple violations and after safety accidents,improve the probability of the construction unit and the supervision unit to adopt positive strategies,and increase the punishment for simple violations has a more significant impact on their strategy choice.Finally,according to the game analysis and simulation results,the corresponding management suggestions are put forward.
Keywords/Search Tags:Building construction, Safe production, Government supervision, Evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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