Research On Contract Incentive Of Green Logistics Service Supply Chain Considering Fairness Concerns And The Government Subsidy

With the increasing attention of the society to environmental protection,the public’s awareness of environmental protection is gradually increasing.The upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain cannot only maintain their position in the competitive market through the green manufacturing process,but need the greening of the whole supply chain.The concept of “green” has also gradually extended from tangible products to intangible services,especially in the logistics field.Therefore,governments around the world also began to vigorously promote subsidy policies to support and guide enterprises to actively build a green logistics service supply chain（Logistics Service Supply Chain,LSSC）,in order to reduce the operation process Environmental harm,improve the green level of logistics services.However,each member in LSSC is an independent economic entity,and the unreasonable distribution of interests among members occurs from time to time.It can be seen that the distribution of interests among members of the supply chain is particularly important to the stable operation of the logistics service supply chain.In addition,behavioral researchers point out that in real life,people pay close attention to their own interests and others,and fairness concern behavior can promote the rationality of interest distribution to a certain extent.In this context,this paper is based on the green LSSC,while comprehensively considering two factors: fairness concern behavior and government subsidy strategy Under the circumstances,the secondary green LSSC set up by a single logistics service integrator and a single logistics service provider is constructed,and the impact of fairness concern behavior and government subsidy strategy on the benefit distribution and contract incentive effect among LSSC members is deeply explored,which is of great significance to stabilize the cooperative relationship among green LSSC members.The specific research contents are as follows:First,the integrator fairness concern behavior is introduced in the green LSSC,and the basic model and the contract model under the fairness concern are constructed,demonstrating that the coordination effect of the revenue sharing contract is better than the cost-sharing contract.By comparing the incentive effect of different contracts under the situation of fairness concerns,it is found that although fairness concern behavior increases the enthusiasm of both parties to rebuild logistics capacity to some extent,it has a negative impact on the relevant decision variables and member utility of LSSC.Therefore,the government subsidy strategy needs to be introduced to encourage the smooth implementation of the contract,so as to realize the stable operation of the green LSSC.Later,the coordinated impact of the government subsidy strategy on the green LSSC under equity concerns was studied.Based on the LSSC,which considers fairness concern behavior,the government subsidy strategy is introduced,constructing the basic model and contract incentive model under two different strategies of subsidy provider and subsidy integrator,respectively.After comparing the incentive effect of different subsidy strategies on LSSC contract under fairness concern,we find that the two subsidy strategies increase the enthusiasm of LSSC members to rebuild the green logistics capacity,and weaken the negative impact of fairness concern behavior on LSSC;under the government subsidy integrator strategy,the revenue sharing contract has Certainability and effectiveness,while the revenue sharing contract remains optimal,the cost sharing contract is better compared to the subsidy integrator.