Research On Low-Carbon Supply Chain Decision-Making Under Different Dominant Forces And Fair Reference Points

With the deterioration of the natural environment and the improvement of consumer awareness of environmental protection,the market and consumers need low-carbon products more urgently than ever.However,it is difficult for enterprises to develop and apply carbon emission reduction technology,which not only needs to bear huge financial pressure,but also exists vicious competition among members of the supply chain.In order to improve the feasibility and sustainability of enterprise carbon emission reduction and implement high-quality carbon emission reduction,the state and the government continue to introduce various policies to support enterprises and encourage them to reduce emissions.At the same time,in order to improve the coordination within the supply chain and reduce unnecessary internal resource consumption,we must consider the fairness concerns of the supply chain participants.To solve the above problems,two game models dominated by manufacturers and dominated by retailers are constructed respectively,taking the government,a manufacturer and a retailer as the research objects,this paper studies the impact of different fairness concerns of a manufacture and a retailer on supply chain decision-making and equilibrium under different fairness reference points(the other party’s profit as the fairness reference point and the Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point),and the results under different fairness reference points are also compared and analyzed.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)In the manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated power structures,when there is a unilateral fairness concern,regardless of the equity reference point,no matter what kind of fairness reference points are used,the direction of the impact of manufacturer and retailer fairness concerns on decision making and equilibrium remains the same,the followers in the supply chain can improve profits through their own fairness concerns.But whether leaders can raise profits through their own fairness concerns depends on the efficiency of the reduction.When both parties are concerned about fairness and the profit of the other party is the reference point of fairness,the influence direction of the leader’s fairness concern degree on decision making and balance remains unchanged,while that of the follower’s fairness concern degree on decision making and balance changes.(2)In the manufacturer-dominated and retailer-dominated supply chain power structures,when both parties are concerned about fairness,compared with the other party’s profit as the fairness reference point,when the Nash bargaining solution is used as the fairness reference point,the impact of the fairness concern of supply chain members on decision-making and equilibrium is lower,the proportion of government subsidies is lower,and the unit emission reduction,market demand and social welfare are higher.The decision result of both parties is closer to the decision result of both parties without fairness concerns,and whether the higher retail price can be obtained depends on the efficiency of the reduction.For the government,the Nash bargaining solution as a fair reference point for supply chain members is always no worse than the profit of the other party as a fair reference point.(3)Taking Nash bargaining solution as a fair reference point is not always advantageous to supply chain members.In the manufacturer-dominated supply chain,the manufacturer’s profit is always higher when the Nash bargaining solution is used as the fair reference point,but the retailer can obtain higher profit when the other party’s profit is used as the fair reference point and only the retailer is concerned about the fairness.In a supply chain dominated by retailers,when one party is concerned about fairness,the party concerned about fairness has a higher profit when taking the other party’s profit as the fair reference point,the party without fairness concern always has a higher profit when taking Nash bargaining solution as the fair reference point,and the manufacturer does not necessarily have a higher profit when both parties are concerned about fairness and take Nash bargaining equilibrium solution as the reference point.