Study On Strategy Selection And Logic Of Local Government In NIMBY Conflict

At present,with the rapid and sound growth of China’s economy,the pace of rural urbanization is also faster.For the sake of the basic needs of economic development and social life,the country has invested hugely in infrastructure construction.Between them,the construction of some public facilities with negative externalities often leads to NIMBY conflicts.Numerous experts and scholars have made a lot in the causes of the formation of the conflict,the types of facilities and the conflict management programs,but the research on the behavior strategies of local governments is relatively small.This paper studies the behavior strategies of local governments in NIMBY conflict and tries to answer the question: what are the strategy choices of local governments in NIMBY situation? What factors will affect the local government’s strategic choice? What is the selection logic of different behavior strategies of local governments in different periods? To this end,the article uses Rubinstein’s rotational bidding game model set to elaborate the game between the authorities and the public.In the first place,this paper summarizes and extracts three behavior strategies of local government,namely "silent","symbolic" and "consultative" behaviors,and analyzes the influence of different influencing factors on the strategy selection of local government in different periods from the combination of multiple variables of public bargaining power and government bargaining cost.Then,this paper analyzes the classic case of the Jiufeng waste incineration plant in Hangzhou,and tests the game process of alternating offers in the NIMBY contexts.The results indicate that because the authorities and the residents do not know the real bargaining power of the other party,they choose their own behavioral strategies in the NIMBY conflict.The two sides are like "the blind riding the blind and the late at night".In the game system,game participants insist on their own opinions and do not give in easily.With the passage of time,the government’s "silent" and other "symbolic" behavior has angered the surrounding residents,result in the breakout of mass incidents,after two rounds of the game,the local government decided to take after many times thinking "consultation" strategy,with the public,eventually making the case be adjacent to avoid a classic case of successful landing facilities.The results show that NIMBY conflict can be regarded as a game process between the government and the public,and both players choose their own behavior strategies when they can’t know each other’s bargaining power.In the process of bidding in turn,the local government’s strategic choice is mainly affected by the bargaining power of the public and its own bargaining cost.After several rounds of different strategic choices,the local government finally reaches a plan acceptable to both sides.At last,the paper makes several recommendations from the aspects of concept,action and system,for improving the government behavioral strategies and decrease the probability of conflict.