Research On Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Overconfidence Under Carbon Trading Regulation

In recent years,a large number of emissions of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide have a growing negative impact on global climate change.In order to curb the trend of global warming,the world’s major economies have taken the total carbon emissions limit and trading regulation as a routine policy measure.Driven by the strong advocacy of the government,the transformation of consumers’ low-carbon consumption concept,and the need for the survival and development of enterprises,many enterprises have joined the action of energy conservation,emission reduction and green marketing.In reality,enterprises do not always make decisions under the condition of complete information,and the decisions are not always completely rational.A large number of behavioral experiments show that overconfidence is the most common and influential irrational psychological characteristic in enterprise decisionmaking.Based on this,this paper studies the low-carbon supply chain decision under the carbon trading regulation from the following two perspectives.Firstly,in the case of information symmetry,the paper studies the emission reduction,promotion efforts and ordering decisions under different rational states in the upstream and downstream of the two-level supply chain.Under the carbon trading regulation,the paper establishes a dynamic game model of Stackelberg complete information under four conditions:full rationality in upstream and downstream,full rationality in upstream and downstream,full rationality in upstream and downstream,and overconfidence in both upstream and downstream.It is found that the order quantity decision of the downstream enterprises are closely related to the overconfidence of the upstream and downstream of the supply chain,while the emission reduction decision of the upstream enterprises are only related to their overconfidence.The influence of the overconfidence of the downstream enterprises on their own expected profits is always positive,but the influence on their own actual profits is not always positive.When only upstream enterprises are overconfident,the impact of overconfidence on the actual profits of upstream enterprises is always positive.When only the downstream enterprises are overconfident,and when both upstream and downstream enterprises are overconfident,the impact of the overconfidence of the downstream enterprises on the actual profits of the upstream and downstream of the supply chain depends on the size of the critical value.When the critical value is small,the influence of overconfidence is positive.When the threshold is large,the effect of overconfidence is negative.Then,the paper further consideration of the uncertainty of the low carbon consumer consciousness and downstream sales promotion cost information privacy,under the condition of overconfidence in the downstream enterprises,build the downstream enterprise promotion cost information open and closed in both cases the Stackelberg incomplete information dynamic game model,research the overconfidence influence business decisions and the expected profit of the supply chain.It is found that the overconfidence of downstream enterprises in consumers’ low-carbon consciousness will affect their order quantity level,but it will not affect upstream enterprises’ emission reduction decision.The overconfidence of upstream enterprises has a negative impact on the decision-making and profit expectation of upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain.Whether the downstream enterprises have the incentive to disclose their promotion cost information depends on their promotion efficiency.The higher the promotion efficiency is,the more motivated the downstream enterprises are to disclose the information.At this time,the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain can obtain higher profits;The lower the promotion efficiency of the downstream enterprises are less willing to disclose information.