Research On The Decision-making And Coordination Of Low-carbon Supply Chain Under The Information Asymmetry Of Promotion Cost

With the users’ awareness of environmental protection and low-carbon preference increasing,consumers have pay more attention to the low-carbon attribute of products.On the basis,relevant enterprises have gradually increased their investment in low-carbon products.Based on the above background,what are the best investment conditions for enterprises to reduce emission,what the supply chain performance and structure like after emission-reduction investment,how to make operation decision of enterprises and design coordination mechanism,and other problems need to be solved.To solve these problems,this research concentrates on the two-level low-carbon supply chain composed of the manufacturer and retailer who make low-carbon investments,considers consumers’ low-carbon preference,and studies the running,collaboration and coordination strategies of the low-carbon supply chain.The specific study is as follows:In the situation of information symmetry,to analyze low-carbonization investment decision-making for manufacturers and retailers,this paper establishes the Stackelberg game model—master-slave game model for the low-carbon supply chain respectively led by the manufacturer and retailer,then obtains the optimal decisions of investment conditions,pricing,and low-carbonization level.According to comparable analysis,whether the manufacturer or retailer dominates the supply chain,the supply chain with low-carbon investment can achieve higher profits;in addition,under different power structures and decision-making modes of supply chain,the equilibrium results of centralized decision-making of enterprises are better than those of decentralized decision-making;after introducing the cost sharing contract,the performance of the supply chain is higher than that of the single wholesale price contract,which can effectively promote the low-carbon supply chain as a whole to make low-carbon investment decisions.In the situation of information asymmetry,aiming at the problems that retailers may conceal the information of low-carbon promotion cost,which leads to the damage of supply chain profits and the decline of performance,this paper introduces the false factor to build a decision-making model in the low-carbon supply chain under the situation of information asymmetry,and discusses retailers’ behaviors of misstating information and coordination strategies under different dominant forces in the low-carbon supply chain.It is found that the misstating strategy has an impact on the distribution of profits among members of the supply chain,the comprehensive achievement of the supply chain,the investment and cost allocation of supply chain.In the supply chain led by manufacturers,retailers will choose to overstate low-carbon promotion costs;in the supply chain led by retailers,retailers will choose to understate low-carbon promotion costs;however,the level of research and development for emission reduction,the level of low-carbon promotion,and the market demand of low-carbon products will be adversely affected.When retailers misstate information,the R&D-promotion cost sharing contract will promote enterprises in the supply chain as a whole to share low-carbonization costs,reach ideal harmonization for low-carbon supply chain,finally,acquire a reasonable allocation of profits among enterprises in the supply chain.Under different information sharing modes,different domination of enterprises,the research proposes cooperative decision-making modes for low-carbonization investment and designs harmonization methods in the low-carbon supply chain.The paper enriches the theoretical research for low-carbon supply chain management under asymmetric information,and also offers examples for enterprises and relevant government agencies in the practice of low-carbon administration.