Carbon Emission Reduction And Pricing Strategies In The Supply Chain Based On Asymmetric Cost Information Under Different Carbon Quota Mechanisms

With the rapid development of e-commerce and network technology,online direct selling channels are constantly emerging.Consumers’ habits also gradually change,the distance between them and manufacturers is greatly shortened,and information transmission is faster.On the other hand,global carbon emissions have been rising year after year,with the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the surface temperature rising continuously.Greenhouse gas emissions are becoming more and more harmful to the environment,and a consensus has been reached on controlling greenhouse gas emissions worldwide.Governments of various countries have successively issued greenhouse gas emission reduction policies,trying to carry out carbon reduction actions through the combination of macro-level policies and market mechanisms.In addition,the enterprises in the supply chain are independent decision-making subjects.Some enterprises,out of consideration of their own interests,often deliberately hide or lie about certain data in an attempt to gain more profits by virtue of information advantages,thus causing the problem of information asymmetry in the supply chain.Asymmetric information will distort the decision variables of decision makers and destroy the coordination of the supply chain,thus affecting the efficiency of the entire supply chain.Obviously,how to realize the low-carbon operation of the dual-channel supply chain under the condition that the decision makers of the supply chain lie about the information is an urgent problem to be solved by all enterprises.The main research of this paper includes the following two parts:The first part establishes a two-channel low-carbon supply chain game model based on cost asymmetry under the two carbon quota mechanisms of "historical method" and"benchmark method" to study the emission reduction and pricing decisions of supply chain members;The second part,on the basis of the above research,further considers the issue of emission reduction and pricing decisions of supply chain members in the case of manufacturer competition.The results of the first part show that:(1)In terms of pricing,with the increasing preference of consumers for low-carbon products,the pricing level of supply chain members is continuously improving.Retailers can set higher retail channel price increases under the carbon quota mechanism of "benchmark method".(2)In terms of low carbon emission reduction,manufacturers’ optimal emission reduction level is higher under the carbon quota mechanism of "benchmark method".(3)In terms of demand,the optimal demand for both channels under the "benchmark method" is higher than that under the "historical method".(4)In terms of profit,the retailer’s optimal profit under the "benchmark method" is higher than that under the "historical method".The manufacturer’s optimal profit under the "historical method" is higher than that under the "benchmark method".(5)In terms of cost misreporting factors,manufacturers will formulate higher optimal misreporting factors under the"benchmark method" carbon quota mechanism.The results of the second part of the study indicate that:(1)The retailer’s optimal pricing decision is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s 1 cost falsehood factor and negatively correlated with the manufacturer’s 2 cost falsehood factor.Any manufacturer’s optimal pricing decision is positively correlated with the cost lie factor of both manufacturers.(2)In terms of low carbon emission reduction,manufacturer 1 will adopt a higher level of emission reduction.The optimal emission reduction level of any manufacturer is positively correlated with the competitor’s cost falsehood factor and negatively correlated with its own cost falsehood factor.(3)Under the competition of manufacturers,manufacturer 1 obtains higher optimal demand.The manufacturer’s optimal demand is negatively correlated with its own cost falsehood factor and positively correlated with the competitor’s cost falsehood factor.(4)In terms of profit,the optimal profit of the two manufacturers under the "historical method" carbon quota mechanism decreases with the increase of the carbon trading price.