Research On Operational Decision-Making Of Dual-channel And Low-carbon Supply Chain On Differential Game

In recent years,the environmental problems caused by the greenhouse effect have become increasingly severe.Many countries,including my country,have begun to carry out low-carbon transitions and explore low-carbon economies.In order to reduce carbon emissions,achieve effective use of resources and sustainable economic development,various countries have adopted policies and measures.Carbon taxes,carbon allowances,and carbon trading policies have emerged from this;companies need to make new strategies to adapt to a lowcarbon economy.In order to improve their core competitiveness,enterprises take emission reduction issues into consideration in their operational decisions,and carry out innovative production of low-carbon products.At the same time,companies can increase market demand through low-carbon promotions.The advent of informatization and the Internet era has brought new development opportunities to members of the supply chain.For manufacturers who want to invade online channels,they face two different choices: establishing online direct sales channels and cooperating with e-commerce platforms.This paper takes the secondary supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer as the research object,introduces dual channels into the low-carbon supply chain,and proposes two scenarios that consider carbon trading policies and those that do not consider carbon trading policies.From a dynamic perspective,the study Manufacturers and retailers’ emission reduction decisions and pricing decisions in different situations,and the impact of different coefficients on decision-making and supply chain profits.The conclusions obtained in this paper are as follows:(1)The level of low-carbon goodwill is a monotonic function of time.Under certain conditions,the level of low-carbon goodwill decreases with time,and vice versa,the level of low-carbon goodwill increases with time.(2)The influence of consumer retail channel preference and manufacturer’s revenue ratio coefficient on optimal price decision.When a manufacturer opens online direct sales,the optimal wholesale price is negatively correlated with consumer retail channel preferences,while the optimal retail price is positively correlated with consumer retail channel preferences.When a manufacturer cooperates with an e-commerce platform,the optimal price strategy is also related to the consumer’s retail channel preference and revenue ratio.A comparative analysis of the optimal price in the two situations is also made.(3)The influence of consumer retail channel preference and manufacturer’s revenue ratio coefficient on optimal emission reduction decisions.When manufacturers choose online direct sales channels,the optimal emission reduction efforts and optimal marketing efforts will decrease as consumers’ preference for retail channels increases;when the manufacturer cooperates with e-commerce platforms,if the manufacturer’s revenue ratio is low,the optimal reduction will be Emission reduction efforts and optimal marketing efforts increase with consumers’ retail channel preferences.Conversely,optimal emission reduction efforts and optimal marketing efforts decrease with consumers’ retail channel preferences.(4)Research has found that carbon trading prices are always positive for retailers’ profits.However,supplier profits and total supply chain profits are convex functions of carbon trading prices,that is,there is a minimum.Therefore,the carbon trading price has a certain value.When the carbon trading price is lower than the fixed value,increasing the carbon trading price will not be conducive to the coordination of the supply chain;when the carbon trading price is higher than the fixed value,continue to increase the carbon trading price.The overall supply chain is favorable.(5)Finally,through a comparative analysis of profits under different situations,it is found that when the manufacturer’s online channel activation cost is high,the manufacturer’s revenue ratio is low,and the carbon trading price is low,regardless of consumer retail channel preferences,carbon trading is not considered.The cooperation between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform is the optimal strategy;when the manufacturer’s online channel opening cost is high,the manufacturer’s revenue ratio is low,and the carbon trading price is high,the cooperation between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under carbon trading is the optimal strategy;When the cost of opening online channels for manufacturers is high,the proportion of manufacturer’s revenue is high,and the carbon trading price is low,regardless of the consumer’s preference for retail channels,cooperation between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms without considering carbon trading is the optimal strategy;when manufacturers’ online channels are opened When the cost,the proportion of the manufacturer’s revenue,and the carbon trading price are all high,the cooperation between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform under carbon trading is the optimal strategy.