Case Study On Executive Equity Incentives Of Listed Companies

Since the implementation of the split share structure reform in China,the continuous improvement and development of the equity incentive system has made it a mainstrea m tool for stimulating talents and improving the corporate governance system of Chinese enterprises,especially listed companies.With the rapid expansion and change of the market scale and environment,the development environment of China’s corporate equity incentive mechanism is obviously difficult to keep up with the market.The singularity of the equity incentive model,the e xistence of industry and regional bias in the implementation of equity incentives by enterprises,and the slow development of equity incentives in China’s state-owned listed companies continue to appear.Therefore,the research on equity incentives needs to be constantly updated in order to bring more favorable theoretical support to the design and implementation of equity incentive programs for enterprises,thereby helping to consolidate the development and effectiveness of corporate equity incentive environments.On the basis of summarizing domestic and foreign research results on equity incentives,this article applies principal-agent theory,adopts research methods such as normative analysis,case analysis,and institutional analysis,and combines the institutional background of Chinese enterprises to carry out equity incentives for executives of listed companies in China.the study.The research content of this paper mainly includes three parts: the first part is theoretical analysis,that is,the theoretical analysis of the basic issues such as the application theory,characteristics,specific content,and usage principles of equity incentives;the second part is the case analysis,that is,the equity of Y listed companies The incentive scheme is analyzed by case.The third part is countermeasures and suggestions.Based on the above-mentioned related theories and case analysis,the internal and external environment of equity incentives of listed companies in China is used to evaluate and recommend the design and implementation of equity incentives of listed companies in China.This article has reached the following conclusions through research: companies must design a reasonable equity incentive plan in order to be recognized by the incentive objects to the maximum extent,so as to maximize the benefits;companies should prevent the relevant risks in equity incentives,such as The impact of manager and manager market risk on the company’s equity structure and executive team building,and even triggering related disputes,thus hindering the smooth implementation of equity incentives;companies must strengthen the indoctrination of corporate equity incentives and deepen their involvement with employees All-round communication between companies,in-depth research on the company and its industry environment,and other basic work related to equity incentives were consolidated.