Research On Information Strategy Of Digital Platform In Competitive Situation

With the rapid development of the digital economy and mobile Internet,the scale of digital platforms is getting larger and larger,and the number of digital users is also increasing.With the increase of network platform users,more and more platforms enter the market to compete.As competition intensifies,the issue of hidden information within the digital platform market has become a major public concern in countries around the world.Therefore,this paper aims to explore the optimal information strategy used in the competition process of oligopolistic platform enterprises,thereby helping digital platforms to obtain competitive advantages through information strategies in the fierce market competition.Based on the theory of two-sided market and game theory,this paper establishes a theoretical model of a competitive bottleneck market(differentiated competition and monopoly),and focuses on the research on the background of information asymmetry in the Internet industry.Under the entry and sequential entry order,the mutual game decision-making process and the market equilibrium state.The specific content of this article is as follows:(1)Fully review the existing literature on digital platform market structure,competitive behavior and information strategy,and summarize the formation of the characteristic market structure of Internet platforms and the internal mechanism of the formation of platform information strategies;(2)Based on the characteristics of digital platform enterprises and the background of information asymmetry in the Internet industry,based on the industrial organization model and the network externality expectation model,establish a duopoly competition model;(3)Based on the model of(2),using the method of game theory to analyze the information strategies of oligopolistic platform enterprises under simultaneous entry and sequential entry,and compare their different effects on pricing,output and profit.Comparing and analyzing the profit expressions of platforms under different competition scenarios,and then obtaining the optimal information strategies of platform-based enterprises under different entry orders;(4)With the help of crawler software and e-commerce data software,collect the case data of pinduoduo and jd.com for differentiation strategy analysis,and then use Stata to estimate the parameters of the network externalities of the two platforms with the help of regression model,and bring the parameters into the mathematical model in(3)to simulate and verify the selection of the platform's optimal information strategy.Through the simulation results,it can be found that it is basically consistent with the conclusions derived from the model,and the conclusions of the model are verified by observing the network externalities and platform differences.The results show that the positive and negative network externalities and platform differences are the main factors affecting the platform information strategy.When oligopoly platforms enter the market at the same time,and the platform difference is very small and has negative network externalities,the platform tends to implement incomplete information strategy.For platforms with positive network externalities,what information strategy to implement is related to the probability of platform difference composition,that is,the platform difference is negatively related to the probability of implementing complete information strategy,Platform differences are positively correlated with the probability of implementing incomplete information strategy;However,when the differences between the two platforms gradually increase,the full information strategy of the two platforms can maximize the benefits.When the platform enters the market in sequence,the platform difference is very small,the first platform will implement the complete information strategy,the second platform will implement the incomplete information strategy under the positive network external effect,and the second platform will implement the complete information strategy under the negative network external effect;When the platform difference increases to a certain range,the first platform will implement the incomplete information strategy,and then the second platform will implement the complete information strategy when the network externality is positive and the incomplete information strategy when the network externality is negative;With the continuous increase of the differences between the two platforms,the full information strategy of the two platforms has the best benefit.In this regard,on the one hand,the government needs to strengthen regulation and clarify the legal boundaries;On the other hand,all major platforms need to strengthen cooperation,give full play to their respective advantages and complement each other.