Research On Smart City Security Management Model And Strategy Based On Signal Game

With the popularity of emerging technologies such as 5g,Internet of things,big data and Internet,the informatization degree of cities is increasing,and smart cities also appear.Social security risks and hidden dangers such as criminal cases,terrorist attacks and social unrest have become increasingly serious in the process of smart city development.It is particularly important to strengthen urban public security.Public security incidents have information asymmetry,suddenness,and randomness in real life.At the same time,the protection resources possessed by the security department are limited and cannot provide 24-hour comprehensive protection for all protection targets.Therefore,security departments choose the optimal defense action strategy and signal strategy for the effective deployment of limited security resources is a key problem that needs to be solved.Game theory provides a theoretical framework and mathematical model for urban public safety management problems.At present,the research on the security game mainly focuses on the game of complete information in the security field.Regarding the analysis of the game mechanism of the attacker and the defender from the perspective of incomplete information theory,considering the intelligence factors between the security department and the attacker,there are few studies on the selection of action strategies and the analysis of strategy tendencies for both sides of the game.In view of this,this paper studies the signal game model of urban public safety management according to the different defense information signal conditions of the security department,and realizes the simulation analysis of the equilibrium strategy between the security department and the attacker in different situations.This paper studies the tendency of the defense signal strategy of the security department and the tendency of the attacker's action strategy by means of numerical analysis with an example of urban public security management.The details are as follows:(1)On the basis of the previous research on the security game model and the dynamic signal game model,aiming at the social and public security problems in the current process of urban intelligence,considering the intelligence information interaction between the security department and the attacker,a defense signal hiding method is constructed.The mechanism of the game model of city security signal,analyzes the security department and the attacker's strategic decision under the strategy of public defense information signal,hidden defense information signal strategy,and the stability of the equilibrium strategy of both sides of the game.The research results show that when the security department discloses defense information,there is a pure strategy equilibrium between the two sides of the game,and the security department can deter the attacker through high defense,so that the attacker can give up the attack.In the case of signal hiding strategy,both sides of the game tend to mix strategies,and the security department cannot completely prevent the attacker through advanced defense technology.The equilibrium strategy is affected by factors such as defense cost,attack cost,and counterattack benefit.(2)This paper analyzes the game between the security department and the attacker,in order to study the tendency of the urban security department between the open defense information signal strategy and the hidden defense information signal strategy,as well as the tendency of the attacker's action strategy.This paper analyzes and compares the benefits and utility of security departments and attackers by using mathematical statistics,so as to obtain the tendency of security departments' signal strategies and the tendency of attackers' actions under different security signals based on the above game model of city security signals.The complex relationship between defense cost,attack cost,counterattack benefit,attack success probability and other factors and tendencies strategy is analyzed through data simulation to provide theoretical reference for urban security governance on this basis.The research results show that in general,the security department prefers to disclose the defense information signal strategy,and the attacker is more likely to attack when the security department hides the defense information.The management effect of urban security departments is better,if the urban security departments comprehensively consider the coordination between the degree of public defense information,the investment of defense resources,and their own counterattack ability.