The Analysis Of The Signal Game Model Of Government Anti-terrorism Under Different Information Status

The problem of terrorism has a long history.It began to spread and develop in the middle and late 20th century.After the 9/11 incident in the early 21st century,it began to attract attention from all walks of life.According to GTD statistics,there were 109673 terrorist attacks in the world from 2001 to 2017.There were 1907 attacks in 2001 and 10900 in 2017.In only 16 years,the number of attacks increased nearly six times,and the frequency of attacks that caused mass deaths increased year by year,excluding those attempted attacks.Terrorism has become a problem that governments all over the world pay close attention to and urgently need to solve.In the anti-terrorism war,intelligence is very important.It can play the role of early warning,decision support,resource allocation and so on.If the government and terrorist organizations have more information about each other,their actions can be more optimized and reasonable.All wars are inseparable from information,especially modern wars,which are dominated by information,deprive the enemy of information advantages,maintain their own information advantages,and then grasp the initiative of the battlefield,to a certain extent,to achieve the operational effect of"subduing the soldiers without fighting".In the study of anti-terrorism,it is generally asymmetric information,especially in the face of terrorist organizations with strong concealment,the government information is particularly important.As two absolute opposites,the government and terrorist organizations will not actively exchange information in the face of terrorism.They can only obtain each other's information by attacking each other,spying intelligence,etc.,and there are many signal transmission in the attack interaction that are very important and worth noting.In terms of signals,general government statements and terrorist organizations claim to be responsible for an event carry less information and cannot guarantee its accuracy for their own purposes.This paper only considers the costly and completely accurate information of military strike degree as a signal to the opposite party,and the government and terrorist organizations generally act successively in anti-terrorism,so no matter they are the first actors.Or the post actor will consider the signal to maximize their own interests,and the post actor should analyze the information carried by the signal in order to facilitate the next step.This paper attempts to establish a signal game model between the government and the terrorist organization from the two perspectives of the government occupying the information superiority and the inferiority,and discusses how to optimize the resources to maximize the utility and reduce the regret caused by the incomplete information when the government is in the superiority,so as to fight against terrorism and prevent terrorism effectively.Yu provides theoretical reference.The specific research work includes the following two points:First of all,this paper analyzes the vicious effect of "more anti more terrorism" caused by America's anti-terrorism in the Middle East.The main reason is that the attack will inevitably bring negative impact on the local area,such as accidental injury to civilians,economic deterioration,ecological impact,etc.at this time,a special group potential terrorists may be affected by the economic and terrorist organization values.Will join the terrorist organization for its effectiveness.The results show that potential terrorists with lower capabilities are more likely to join terrorist organizations.Therefore,when the government conducts military strikes in advance,it is necessary to consider how to pacify civilians,especially low-income people,and avoid a small number of potential terrorists from joining the terrorist organizations.In addition,the government's military strike resources are affected by the anti-terrorism budget.When the government has mastered most of the information superiority of terrorist organizations,it can use the optimal signal strike degree to reach the threshold of the surrender of terrorist organizations to maximize the benefits.Because of the lack of information about the government's anti-terrorism budget,terrorist organizations can only make decisions by minimizing the expected losses.Second,considering that the government is in a position of information disadvantage,it is uncertain about the type,effectiveness and next action of terrorist organizations.It can only rely on the signals sent by terrorist organizations to form a posterior belief to make decisions.This paper calculates the utility functions of the government,the far left terrorist organization and the far right terrorist organization respectively,and analyzes the possible decision regrets of the government under incomplete information.The results show that the government should also be alert to strengthen defense rather than general defense in the face of small signals,and should be careful to make a decision to fight back or defense when receiving large signals.In addition,the government can effectively reduce the regret value by freezing assets and other measures.The innovation of this paper lies in the fact that when the government is in the information superiority,the counter-terrorism budget is regarded as the government type and the terrorist organization lacks the information,and the budget is used as a continuous variable to conduct continuous signal game research.It analyzes the conditions under which potential terrorists join terrorist organizations or engage in normal economic activities.In addition,the government's decision-making research when the information is inferior can provide a certain theoretical reference for the government to counter terrorism.However,this paper only sets up a two-stage signal game model,which fails to extend to multi-stage dynamic games and introduces the influence of learning,evolution and other factors.This will be a future research direction.