The Research On Water-saving Mechanism And Effect Of "Fee To Tax" Of Water Resources In China

Water is an irreplaceable and indispensable just-needed resource.The global water resources are seriously unbalanced in light-salty,solid-liquid,and regional distribution,compared with unlimited rigid demand,the fresh water resources that can be directly utilized by humanity are more scarce and accounting for only about 13% of fresh water or 0.26% of global water.The UN underlines that the water crisis will be the next one after oil.China is already one of the more than ten most water-poorest countries because the China's water per capita is only 1/4 of the world's that.Contemporary water problem has escalated to a major strategic issue restricting development and progress of human.With the contradiction between the per capita shortage and the rigid demand of water resources becomes increasingly prominent,our country's original water resources fee system can't meet the needs of the new situation,and it is urgent to deepen reforms.In the second half of 2016 and at the end of 2017,the two batches of “1+9” water resources “fee to tax”pilot policies have been implemented,it is no doubt that constructing a water-saving society and enhancing demand-side management for promoting water conservation and protection are urgent tasks and topics of the times in the future.This paper seizes the current window period of pilot policy,and follows the logic of introduction,theory,mechanism,effect,reference,and suggestions,and focuses on studying the water-saving mechanism and water-saving effects of the pilot policy,and proposes policy recommendations for deepening reforms.In aspect of water-saving mechanism,firstly,this paper analyzes the essence of rent,fee and tax of water resources and the ownership,managerial power and political power on which they are based from the angle of theoretically,sorts out the process of water resource fee and tax reform in China,and proposes the perspective that water resource fee and tax reform was in a long-term “dislocation of tax and fee”situation in the past,it is believed that there are two situations of “substituting fee for rent” and “substituting fee for tax” in different historical stages,and China's water resources from zero to fee to tax is a gradual process of discarding,the process of discarding depends on the historical change of the staged positioning of China's water management policy and the overall social perception of water issues with the gradual improvement of the level,this “fee to tax” is a major breakthrough,and it is gradually turning to “return of tax and fee”.Secondly,from the perspective of mechanism,this paper believes the water-saving mechanism of this pilot policy is based on the optimization of the levy and management system from fee to tax,This paper compares and analyzes the system difference from fee to tax,from the subjects of levy and management,levy and management processes,levy and management objects,levy standards,legislative level,law enforcement efforts,and designated funds,etc,analyzes the optimization process of the “fee to tax” in levy and management system and practice,so as to provide mechanism support for the better water saving of water resources tax than fee.In aspect of water-saving effects,a multi-period DID model is established,and the panel data of national cities from 2014 to 2018 are selected to empirically analyze whether the pilot policy can promote water saving.First,the average effects of the pilot policy on various types of water consumptions and water efficiency are analyzed,then the dynamic effects of the policy over time and the spatial heterogeneity effects of the main indicators in different regions are further analyzed,meanwhile the credibility of the empirical conclusions is supported by a series of robustness tests.The empirical conclusions show that:(1)In aspect of average effects,the pilot policy reduces the total water consumption,underground water consumption,production operation water consumption,and reduces the water consumption of 10,000 yuan of GDP,but has almost no impact on the surface water consumption and domestic water consumption,that is,the pilot policy play a structural water-saving function.(2)In aspect of dynamic effects,the pilot policy has a strong and slow water-saving effect on the total water consumption and production operation water consumption,and has a weak and fast water-saving effect on the water consumption of 10,000 yuan of GDP and underground water consumption.(3)In aspect of spatial heterogeneity effects,the pilot policy's the water-saving effect on underground water consumption is gradually enhanced with the increase of water users,the water-saving effect on total water consumption and production operation water consumption is gradually enhanced with the increase of regional GDP,the water-saving effect on surface water consumption and underground water consumption is gradually enhanced with the increase of water resources,and the water-wasting effect on total water consumption and production operation water consumption is gradually enhanced with the increase of water resources.In aspect of policy recommendations,according to the analysis conclusions based on theory,mechanism and effect,meanwhile learning from foreign water management experience,this paper gives the directions of further deepening reform of the water resources tax system from the perspectives of tax rate system,agricultural water,tax preference,supervision and monitoring,designated funds,and comprehensive levy,etc,and proposes to improve other supporting mechanisms to better help release the water-saving dividends of the water resources tax.